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Abstract
This Article focuses in part on what the approach to market definition in the EC reveals about
its competition policy generally. There are additional reasons why lawyers should consider market
definition issues. In the two sections of this Article, the EC approach to market definition will be
examined. The treatment of market definition under Articles 85 and 86 is considered first, followed
by a more detailed description and evaluation of cases under the Merger Regulation.
THE PROBLEM OF MARKET DEFINITION
UNDER EC COMPETITION LAW
Thomas E. Kauper*
INTRODUCTION
To U.S. antitrust lawyers, judges, and juries, market defini-
tion is a process dominated by economists who shape lawyers'
arguments and engage in testimonial battles in court. The defi-
nition of relevant markets is often critical to outcomes, and a
commensurately high amount is often expended on developing
economic studies bearing on the issue. Because market defini-
tion is typically seen, at least today, as an economic issue, it is
legitimate to consider whether a non-economist lawyer has, or
should have, anything of consequence to say about the topic.
Why, in short, should a lawyer, and a U.S. one at that, be ad-
dressing market definition in the European Community?
Simply put, the answer is that the manner in which markets
are defined is often relevant to assessing the policies, not all of
which are economic, underlying the development in any given
system of competition policy standards. This Article focuses in
part on what the approach to market definition in the EC reveals
about its competition policy generally. There are additional rea-
sons why lawyers should consider market definition issues. The
application of precedent may be critical. A lawyer must at least
understand the process sufficiently well to keep his or her econo-
mists within the legal bounds already established by judicial or
administrative action. The role played by market definition in
antitrust cases must also be fully understood. In U.S. antitrust
law, liability often rests on how markets are defined. There are
more subtle effects as well. The identity of companies that bear
liability may depend in some cases on whether they are in or out
of a market. Discovery may be limited to documents or even
deposition testimony affecting identified markets. Also of con-
siderable importance, relief will be aimed at eliminating anti-
competitive conduct and effects within the market identified as
relevant in the course of determining liability. These are not
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purely economists' issues, but issues that relate directly to and
are affected by broader policies that should be brought to bear
in competition policy analysis.
In the United States we tend to think of market definition as
an economic issue because we think of antitrust policy itself
solely in economic terms. Antitrust intervention in the economy
is driven solely by concern over consumer welfare, or, more pre-
cisely, the sole goal of antitrust enforcement is to eliminate pri-
vate arrangements among firms that restrict output and increase
price, or at least threaten to do so.1 Within this economic effi-
ciency model of antitrust, the role of market definition is rela-
tively clear-cut. Markets must be defined to assist in determining
whether the firms whose conduct is being examined have mar-
ket power, as in sufficient power individually or collectively to
have adverse price and output effects. Market definition then
comes into play when market power is relevant. Market share is
a surrogate, imperfect to be sure, for proof of market power.2
Proof of market power therefore requires, in most cases, that rel-
evant markets must be defined in product and geographic
terms. Market definition's function is to determine whether
there are firms that will check the ability of those whose conduct
is questioned to raise prices to noncompetitive levels.
Today, then, market definition in the United States is
largely an element of economic analysis. But it was not always so.
In the 1960s, for example, scant attention was paid to market
definition in vertical cases. Markets were defined, if at all, in
relatively narrow terms. Because the analysis in these cases did
not generally rest on the consumer welfare model as we now
know it, but focused instead on notions of fairness, protection of
small business, and entrepreneurial independence, market defi-
nition was either completely irrelevant or employed for a differ-
1. The debate over whether the only goal of antitrust is economic efficiency still
goes on, but is outside the scope of this Article. At the present time, the statement in
the text reflects the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). Even those who do not accept
all of the analysis of the so-called Chicago School would most likely agree that the goals
of antitrust are economic, and that the identification of market power is an economic
issue. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 61-71 (1994) (discussing role of economics in antitrust, including
development of Chicago School).
2. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., IIA ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 160-167 (1995) (defining market share).
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ent purpose, such as establishing the dependence of distributors
on their suppliers. 3 The submarket concept commonly em-
ployed by the Supreme Court in merger cases of the 1960s and
1970s had little basis in economics and appeared to be used pri-
marily as a vehicle for controlling mergers for reasons that did
not always seem to reflect economic goals at all.4
Even today, proof of market power is not required in all
American antitrust cases that apply the consumer welfare model.
In these cases, markets need not be defined. The most obvious
cases are cartel cases in which the classic per se rule, which by
definition does not depend on proof of market power, is ap-
plied.5 The per se rule does reflect a direct concern over the
price and output effects of cartel behavior, but is based also on
the need efficiently to deter conduct thought to have adverse
effects in almost all cases, and beneficial effects in virtually none,
with a precise and unambiguous rule. Even in cases where proof
of market power is essential to establishing liability, markets
need not be defined where adverse price and/or output effects
are directly established.6 In the U.S. system, however, direct
proof of adverse price and output effects is seldom successful.
U.S. courts are both skeptical of and uncomfortable with at-
tempts to establish that challenged conduct has had adverse
price effects." The European Commission ("Commission") and
European Court of Justice ("Court of Justice") have had a far
greater willingness to examine price effects and output directly.8
Logically, then, we might expect a larger number of European
cases in which proof of effect is required but markets are not
defined.
3. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California, 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
4. The best example of gerrymandering of submarkets to find a merger unlawful is
discussed in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Rome Cable), where the
Supreme Court, discussed in essence, made up a submarket of its own. 377 U.S. 271
(1964). Today, most scholars agree that the concept of submarkets is of little relevance.
Any grouping of sales as to which prices can be significantly raised above competitive
levels is a market, not a submarket. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 87-89.
5. The per se rule, which has been applied repeatedly and reaffirmed, first appears
in its present form in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
6. See FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986); NCAA v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984).
7. See Thomas E. Kauper, Whither Artice 86? Observations on Excessive Prices and Re-
fusals to Deal, in 1989 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 651, 656 (Barry Hawk ed., 1990).
8. This is primarily because excessive pricing may constitute an abuse of a domi-
nant position under Article 86. See id. at 659-68.
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Market definition is now an essential element in a broad
range of U.S. cases. Indeed, one can plausibly argue that it is
necessary in all but cartel and resale price maintenance cases. In
virtually all vertical cases except those involving resale price
maintenance, 9 some proof of market power must be made, proof
normally resting on market share. In tie-in cases, market power
in the tying market must be shown." Substantial foreclosure of
competitors from a downstream or upstream market is the criti-
cal element in finding an exclusive dealing violation. Foreclo-
sure is normally measured by use of market share data." Cases
challenging non-price vertical restraints, such as territorial pro-
tections and customer restrictions, must get through a prelimi-
nary market power showing, a showing based on market share.12
A similar market power screen is being utilized in a variety of
non-cartel horizontal cases under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.1" Market share data has been the starting point of all litiga-
tion under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, at least since Judge
Learned Hand came down from the mountain in the Alcoa case
with his long familiar market share numbers chiseled in stone.1 4
All monopolization cases start with market definition as the first
step in establishing that the defendant possesses monopoly
power, an essential element in the proof of violation.' 5 Indeed,
in many monopolization cases market share is more than a sur-
rogate for market power. In such cases, the ability to dominate
rivals is directly dependent on market share. a6 Since the Spec-
trum Sports case,1 7 it is equally clear that the plaintiff must estab-
lish the relevant market in an attempt to monopolize cases
under Section 2. Market definition has been the first step in
merger litigation at least since the first major cases were brought
9. While the scope of the per se rule against resale price maintenance has been
constricted in recent years, the rule, which does not require proof of market power,
remains intact. See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717
(1988); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
10. Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
11. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 176-77 (3d ed.
1992).
12. Id. at 125.
13. See, e.g., K.M.B. Warehouse Distributors, Inc. v. Walker Manufacturing Co., 61
F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing non-cartel horizontal cases).
14. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
15. See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 11, at 196-97.
16. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 245.
17. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
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after the critical 1950 amendments to Section 7 of the Clayton
Act.1 8
While market share data, and thus market definition, is a
central element in each of these types of cases, it does not follow
that market share data carries the same weight in each case. In a
variety of Section 1 cases, for example, proof of market power is
often used as a screening device to eliminate cases where there is
no real likelihood that the conduct at issue could result in ad-
verse price and output effects. Low market share in these cases
provides virtually conclusive evidence that the defendant or de-
fendants lack market power. Similarly, various guidelines of the
Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission, most nota-
bly the 1992 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines ("1992 Merger
Guidelines"), establish market share and concentration levels be-
low which the conduct in question is safe from challenge. a9 Mar-
ket shares are virtually the exclusive measure of these safe
harbors. This makes good sense. These screens and safe
harbors simply result either in the elimination of cases from the
enforcement system or in the taking of the case to a more de-
tailed analysis. They tend to be set conservatively at relatively low
levels. Where the relevant data creates any real ambiguity, the
case may proceed to the next stage, where market share data is
simply the starting point and market power can be examined in
the setting of a variety of other structural and conduct elements
as well. It would be plausible to define markets in very narrow
terms for the purpose of such screening, even though the same
markets might be more broadly, and realistically, defined in sub-
sequent proceedings or in the more detailed analysis that will
follow for those cases that get past the screen. Some cases can be
disposed of simply by assuming the narrowest possible market, a
practice with which those who follow notifications under the EC
Merger Regulation will be familiar. In cases that get past these
preliminary screens or safe harbors, less weight may be given to
18. The analysis of mergers by both the United States Department ofJustice and
the Federal Trade Commission, for example, always starts with market definition. See
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 1.0 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES] (discussing market def-
inition).
19. Id. § 1.51. The 1996 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Statements of Enforcement Policy and Analytical Principles Relating to Health Care
and Antitrust make similar use of market shares.
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market shares, and other factors suggestive of market power are
likely to be examined. While market share may be a critical in-
dependent factor in some monopolization cases, in merger cases
market shares are simply the starting point.
The need to establish market shares, and thus to define
markets, is somewhat less clear in EC competition policy. This is
true, at least in part, because its policy is not entirely based on
the economic efficiency model now prevalent in the United
States. Under Article 86 market shares provide at least the start-
ing point in determining whether a firm holds a dominant posi-
tion."° Similarly, Merger Regulation cases invariably begin with
market definition and a determination of the market shares of
the parties. In both of these classes of cases, the role of market
definition is similar to the role it plays in the United States
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, dealing with monopoliza-
tion, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, regarding mergers.
The need for and role of market definition and the determi-
nation of market shares under Article 85 is more difficult to de-
scribe. For certain types of agreements, proof of market power
or actual competitive effects does not appear to be a necessary
element in determining whether the agreement in question has
as its "object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of
competition within the common market" and is therefore within
the prohibition of Article 85(1). But even if market shares are
not considered in the Article 85(1) analysis, they may be utilized
in the same case in determining whether, under Article
85(3) (b), the agreement creates "the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question" and is thus not eligible for exemption. And in some
cases, particularly those involving cartels, markets may be de-
fined in determining the level of fines.21
Cartel agreements have generally been condemned without
an evaluation of their actual effects because their "object" is the
restriction of competition, although the decision of the Court of
First Instance in Societa Italiana Vetro SpA v. Commission22 may cast
20. See, e.g., Hilti AG v. Commission, Case T-30/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1439, 1 64,
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 16, affd, Case C-53/92P, [1994] E.C.R. 1-667; Tetra Pak International
SA v. Commission, Case T-83/91, [1995] E.C.R. 11-755, 91, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 726.
21. Societe Cooperative des Asphalteurs Belges (Belasco) & Others v. Commission,
Case 246/86, [1989] E.C.R. 2117, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 96.
22. Societa Italiana Vetro SpA v. Commission, Joined Cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and
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some doubt on whether market definition is a precondition of
finding a violation even in such cases. 23 The case is also of inter-
est because the Commission appeared to suggest that market
definition plays a different role under Article 85(1) than under
Article 86, and that the market in that case should be defined
differently under Articles 85 and 86, a distinction that the Court
of First Instance seemed to find puzzling.24 Market definition
and market shares have been a central feature of a variety of
other horizontal agreement cases, both in determining the ap-
plicability of both Article 85(1) and Article 85(3) .25
In vertical cases, the need for market definition rests on the
nature of the agreement. While the Commission's position on
resale price maintenance has shifted over time from a relatively
lenient approach to one that is much more severe, market defi-
nition and an assessment of market power do not currently ap-
pear to be a necessary element in finding a violation. 26 Restric-
tions on distributors, which have the effect of prohibiting paral-
lel imports across.national boundary lines, are flatly prohibited
without any assessment of market structure or competitive ef-
fects, a rule predicated not on competitive concerns but on the
fundamental goal of market integration.2 7 The need for market
definition and evaluation of market structure in exclusive
purchasing cases under Article 85(1), as well as Article 85(3), is a
complex subject that will not be pursued here.28 In general, it
can be said that in vertical cases, the Commission and EC courts
T-78/89, [1992] E.C.R. 11-1403, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 302. See also Groupement des Cartes
Bancaires v. Commission,Joined Cases T-39/92 and T-40/92, [1994] E.C.R. 11-49, 94.
23. See Commission Decision No. 94/601/EEC, OJ. L 243/1, (1994), [1994] 5
C.M.L.R. 547 (Cartonboard) (reflecting conventional approach). "Given the manifestly
anti-competitive object of the cartel, it is not strictly necessary... for the Commission to
find that there was also an appreciable effect on market conditions." Cartonboard, OJ. L
243/1, 135, [1994] 5 C.M.L.R. 547.
24. Id. 363.
25. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 94/815/EC, OJ. L 343/1 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Cement] (dealing with Article 85(1)); Commission Decision No. 94/322/EC, OJ. L
144/20 (1994) (Exxon/Shell) (discussing Article 85(3)); Commission Decision No. 94/
770/EC, OJ. L 309/1 (1994) (Pasteur Merieux-Merck) (relating to Article 85(3)).
26. See BARRY HAW-K, 2 UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET, AND INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
TRUST 525-29 (1990).
27. This has been the case since the decision in Consten and Grundig v. Commis-
sion. Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418; see Commis-
sion Decision No. 92/154/EEC, OJ. L 66/1 (1992), [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 42 (Eco System/
Peugeot) (providing recent example).
28. See Delimitis v. Henninger Brau AG, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935,
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have placed greater emphasis on intra-brand effects than is cur-
rently the case in the United States. These effects can be mea-
sured without a full evaluation of markets.
Market definition may also be at issue in applying the Com-
mission's Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance29 ("No-
tice"), which provides that agreements "generally" do not fall
within Article 85(1) if the goods and services that are the subject
of the agreements, and their equivalents produced by the agree-
ing firms, do not exceed five percent of the total market for
these goods and services "in the area affected by the agreement,"
and the annual turnover of the firms does not exceed 200 mil-
lion ECU. The Notice specifically provides as follows:
The relevant product market includes besides the contract
products any other products which are equivalent or identical
to them .... The products in question must be interchangea-
ble. Whether or not this is the case must be judged from the
vantage point of the user, normally taking the characteristics,
price, and intended use together. In certain cases, however,
products can form a separate market on the basis of their
characteristics, price, or intended use alone. This is true es-
pecially where consumer preferences have developed.30
This provision is set forth in its entirety because its "characteris-
tics, price, and intended use" formula appears regularly, in an
almost ritualistic way, in other Commission regulations and deci-
sions, including decisions under the Merger Regulation. This
approach to market definition is based entirely on demand sub-
stitutability and could lead to relatively narrow product market
definitions. Supply substitutability is excluded from considera-
tion. Defining markets solely in terms of any one of the three
elements set forth, characteristics, prices, and intended use,
could result in the use of markets that a more detailed analysis
would reject. This is particularly true if markets were to be de-
fined in terms of prices alone, as discussed later.
The Notice further provides that the relevant geographic
market is the area "within the Community where the agreement
[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210; Langanese-Iglo GmbH v. Commission, Case T-7/93, [1995]
E.C.R. 11-1533, [1995] 5 C.M.L.R. 602.
29. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 231/2 (1986) [hereinafter Notice on Agree-
ments] (discussing agreements not covered by Article 85(1)).
30. Id. at 3.
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produces its effects."3 1 If the goods covered by the agreement
are regularly bought and sold in the EU Member States, the mar-
ket would be Community-wide. Areas where the contract prod-
ucts cannot be bought and sold, or where such purchases are
irregular, are to be excluded. The market will be narrower than
the whole Community where the characteristics of the contract
products restrict their mobility. For example, when transport
costs are high relative to the products' value, or where move-
ment of the products is hindered by barriers to entry resulting
from legal or regulatory requirements imposed by Member
States, the market will be narrower than the whole Community.
However, this presumption ceases if these existing barriers can
"be overcome by reasonable effort and at an acceptable cost."
3 2
Under U.S. antitrust analysis, the area in which the parties
sell is the starting point. Depending upon likely responses of
firms outside the area to a significant price increase, the market
may be broader. The Notice appears to exclude the possibility
that the market could be broader than the Common Market.
Under the Notice, therefore, geographic markets may be nar-
rower than those identified using the conventional U.S. ap-
proach, and, indeed, than in some cases decided by the Commis-
sion itself, particularly under the Merger Regulation.
A number of the Commission block exemptions also call for
the definition of markets. Under the regulation establishing the
block exemption for specialization agreements, for example,
such agreements are not exempted if the products involved ex-
ceed twenty percent of the market. 33 Market definition may also
be necessary in applying the block exemptions for exclusive dis-
tribution agreements, 34 exclusive purchasing agreements, 35 and
research and development agreements, 36 all of the which use the
"characteristics, price, and intended use" formula of the Notice.
The market definition that uses the analysis described in the
Notice and block exemptions may often result in narrow and in
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Commission Regulation No. 417/85, art. 3, O.J. L 53/11, (1985).
34. Commission Regulation No. 1983/83, art. 3, OJ. L 173/1, at 3, corrected version
in O.J. L 281/24 (1983).
35. Commission Regulation No. 1984/83, art. 3, OJ. L 173/5, at 8, corrected version
in O.J. L 281/24 (1983).
36. Commission Regulation No. 418/85, art. 3, O.J. L 53/5, at 8-9 (1985).
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some cases unrealistic markets is not a basis for condemnation.
These are safe harbor provisions, and a cautious approach is ex-
pected. Cases above these various threshold levels are not un-
lawful. Their legality will turn on a much fuller inquiry. These
provisions simply eliminate relatively easy cases from more for-
mal, time-consuming, and costly study. It does not follow, how-
ever, that the same limited analysis should be applied to cases
where full inquiry is required.
In the two subsequent sections of this Article, the EC ap-
proach to market definition will be examined. The treatment of
market definition under Articles 85 and 86 is considered first,
followed by a more detailed description and evaluation of cases
under the Merger Regulation. The Articles 85 and 86 cases are
important in themselves and also provide a background and a
basis for comparison with the large set of notifications and deci-
sions issued over a relatively short period of time under the
Merger Regulation. With respect to Articles 85 and 86 cases, this
study will be quite selective, focusing on a relatively small
number of older, leading cases and on cases decided since 1989,
the year in which the Merger Regulation was adopted.
I. MARKET DEFINITION UNDER ARTICLES 85 AD 86
Historically, market definition under Articles 85 and 86 was
handled primarily by the Commission. While the Court of Jus-
tice set overall standards, it has generally deferred to the Com-
mission on their application in particular cases. In cases re-
ferred to the Court of Justice by courts of Member States, cases
that tend to present relatively general and very abstract questions
under EC law, the Court ofJustice has left questions such as the
assessment of dominance, and, therefore, market definition, to
those courts. 7 With the creation of the Court of First Instance,
which is charged, among other matters, with responsibility for
the review of Commission findings in competition cases, the
handling of issues has changed. The Court of First Instance has
examined market definition issues with care in a number of
cases.38 As what is effectively the court of last resort on these
37. See, e.g., Bodson v. Pornpes Funebres des Regions Liberees SA, Case 30/87,
[1988] E.C.R. 2479, [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 984.
38. See generally Tetra Pak [1995] E.C.R. 11-755, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 726; Langanese-
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questions, its opinions carry considerable weight and serve as a
significant restraint on the Commission.
Most significant market definition decisions, apart from
those under the Merger Regulation, have come in Article 86 pro-
ceedings. As already noted, there are a variety of Article 85 cases
in which analysis of market power and the measurement of ef-
fects is simply not relevant. In some Article 85 cases where
power and effects are evaluated, markets are not formally de-
fined, although many of the facts relevant to such a definition
play a role in the Commission's competitive analysis.39 Article
86, on the other hand, virtually invites the use of market share
data in determining whether a firm is dominant, and markets
are defined, and often contested, in virtually every Article 86
case. It is not unusual in cases charging that conduct violates
both Articles 85 and 86 to find that the discussion of market
definition is confined to the portion of the decision dealing with
Article 86.40
This dichotomy results from a perception that the role of
market definition under these two Articles differs. In Vereniging
van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid
& Ors v. Commission,41 the Court of First Instance explained the
difference as follows:
For the purposes of Article 86, the proper definition of the
relevant market is a necessary precondition for any judgment
as to allegedly anti-competitive behaviour ... since, before an
abuse of a dominant position is ascertained, it is necessary to
establish the existence of a dominant position in a given mar-
ket, which presupposes that such a market has already been
defined. For the purposes of applying Article 85, the reason
for defining the relevant market is to determine whether the
agreement ... is liable to affect trade between Member States
and has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction, or
Iglo, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1533 [1995] 5 C.M.L.R. 602; Hilti [1991] E.C.R. IH-1439, [1992] 4
C.M.L.R. 16.
39. See generally Commission Decision No. 90/410/EEC, O.J. L 209/15 (1990),
[1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 832 (Elopak/Metal Box-Odin).
40. See Societa Italiana Vetro SpA [1992] E.C.R. at II-1403, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 302;
Commission Decision No. 92/262/EEC, O.J. L 134/1 (1992), [1993] 5 C.M.L.R. 322
[hereinafter French-West African Shipowners' Committees].
41. Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de Bouwn-
ijverheid v. Commission, Case T-29/92, [1995] E.C.R. 11-289.
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distortion of competition within the Common Market.4 2
The applicants' objection to the Commission's market defini-
tion, therefore, was not to be considered as a matter apart from
the assessment of competitive effects and the impact on inter-
state trade. To a U.S. lawyer, the meaning of this passage will
seem obscure. At a minimum, it suggests that markets need not
be formally defined in Article 85 cases, and that the facts under-
lying market definition will simply be assessed as part of the
broader "objects/effects" inquiry. Does it also suggest that mar-
kets may actually be defined differently in the two types of cases?
There is little to suggest that this has been the case.4 3
A. The Definition of Product Markets
Issues of product market definition can arise in a variety of
circumstances. Most often, the issue is whether the market
should include products, other than that produced by those
whose conduct is at issue, that may serve as substitutes to which
at least some consumers would turn in the event of a significant
price increase. In the United States, product market definition
is based on a number of factors designed to measure the re-
sponses of both consumers, demand substitutability, and suppli-
ers, supply substitutability, to such an increase. The market is
expanded to include all products that, if controlled by one firm,
could give that firm the ability to profitably increase price signifi-
cantly. Included in the market are those firms not currently pro-
ducing these products but likely to do so within 'one year and
without significant sunk costs.4 4 This broad substitutability stan-
dard requires the evaluation of a number of separate factors.
Product market definition includes a variety of other issues.
When, if ever, should markets involving the same product be de-
fined in terms of end use? The answer given by U.S. enforce-
ment agencies is only when those buyers can be targeted for a
price increase, that is, only when the seller can successfully price
42. Id. at 11-317, 74; see also Opinion of Advocate General Mischo, Belasco, [1989]
E.C.R. at 2117, 13, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. at 101.
43. In Societa Italiana Vetro SpA, the Court of Justice seemed puzzled by the Com-
mission's apparent definition of the market one way under Article 85 and another way
under Article 86. Societa Italiana Vetro SpA [1992] E.C.R. at 11-1549, 363, [1992] 5
C.M.L.R. at 405-06.
44. 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 1.32.
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discriminate.45 Is so-called captive production, that portion of
the production of a given product consumer internally by the
firm, included in the market? In the United States, it is gener-
ally included.4 6
Invariably, both product and geographic market definitions
involve matters of degree and an element of arbitrariness. The
process examines likely consumer responses when not all con-
sumers are alike. The availability of data may bind the inquiry.
Lines may be drawn in part simply because of elements of ad-
ministrative convenience and predictability. The standards
adopted may also reflect broad policy considerations that are not
entirely economic, even when the analysis appears to be so. In
measuring responses to a price increase, for example, the size of
the projected increase first must be determined.4 7 Similarly,
market definition necessarily involves a time element, particu-
larly when supplier response is at issue.48 In both cases there are
explicit or implicit assumptions about how much market power
is to be tolerated and for how long. Every antitrust system must
make these choices.
1. The Early Cases
The Court of Justice first addressed product market defini-
tion in a detailed way in the Continental Can case.49 The Com-
mission found that the firm in question was dominant in markets
defined as "light containers for canned meat products," "light
containers for seafood," and "metal closures for the food packag-
ing industry." Most of its analysis focused on the inclusion in
these markets of glass and plastic containers. Because of differ-
ent physical characteristics of packaging materials and in the ma-
chines used for packaging, the market was confined to metal
containers. The Court of Justice found fault with the Commis-
sion's analysis. The Commission's failure to explain how its
three markets differed from one another, and therefore from a
45. Id. at § 1.12.
46. See Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 416; AREEDA, supra note 2, 535e.
47. The current United States Merger Guidelines, for example, simply refer to a
"small but significant" price increase, and suggest a figure of five percent. 1992 MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 1.11.
48. See id. at § 1.32 (discussing firms that participate in relevant market through
supply response).
49. Europemballage Corp. v. Commission, Case 6/72, [1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973]
C.M.L.R. 199 [hereinafter Continental Can].
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broader light metals container market, was critical. Specifically,
while the Court ofJustice recognized that "limited interchangea-
bility with other products" was insufficient to place them in the
same market, the Commission failed to consider that manufac-
turers of other light metal containers might, "with simple adapta-
tion," -enter this market. It also found inconsistencies in the
Commission's analysis of glass and plastic containers. At the very
outset, the Court of Justice stressed supply substitutability, a fac-
tor that over time has tended to disappear from Commission de-
cisions.
The emphasis shifted to demand substitutability in United
Brands,50 where the Court of Justice upheld the Commission's
determination that the relevant market was bananas rather than
all fresh fruit. Despite findings that at various times of the year
sales of other fruits then in season exerted price pressure on ba-
nanas and reduced their volume of sales, the Court of Justice
concluded that there was no long-term, apparently meaning
year-long, cross-elasticity between bananas and other fruits. It
explained this result in terms of physical characteristics such as
taste, softness, ease of handling, and the availability over the en-
tire year to a particular group whose need for bananas was con-
stant, namely "the young, the old, and the sick." The decision
has been criticized rightly by a number of commentators for its
reliance on the needs of a particular subgroup of purchasers
without evidence of the volume of their purchases or that
United Brands could segregate their purchases and successfully
impose a higher price on them.5" The decision can also be ques-
tioned because of its quick dismissal of the availability of apples
and oranges throughout the year. The Court of Justice simply
asserts, for example, that oranges are not interchangeable. But
whatever the outcome, United Brands set the stage for a series of
cases placing emphasis on the demand side, with physical char-
acteristics of the products playing a leading role. In Hoffman-
LaRoche,52 for example, thirteen categories of vitamins were
characterized as separate markets based on their specific bionu-
50. United Brands Co. v. Commission, Case 27/76, [19781 E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1
C.M.L.R. 429.
51. See, e.g., VALENTINE KoRAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW
AND PRACTICE 72 (5th ed. 1994).
52. Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211.
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tritive functions. With respect to these functions, vitamins were
in a market separate from such things as food, even though food
obviously performs the same functions. Of greater significance
was the Court of Justice's rejection of the inclusion in the vita-
min market of vitamins used for technological purposes, con-
cluding that the two categories of use, nutritional and technolog-
ical, were not interchangeable. The net result, as other have
noted, was to place vitamins in two markets based on end use,
again without any showing that separate prices could be success-
fully set for each. 3
The issues before the Court of Justice in Michelin54 were
more complex than in these other early cases. The Commission
found that Michelin held a dominant position in a market de-
fined as new replacement tires for heavy vehicles, a market that
did not include the same tires when sold to vehicle manufactur-
ers, that is, original equipment manufacturers or "OEMs", auto
or light van tires, and retreads. The Court of Justice upheld the
Commission's definition. To a greater degree than in the cases
just discussed, the Court ofJustice relied upon a whole range of
factors. Original equipment tires, even though in many cases
physically the same as replacement tires, were excluded from the
market because of differences in dealing with and meeting the
needs of vehicle manufacturers as opposed to replacement tire
distributors. Auto tires were excluded because of different physi-
cal characteristics, consumer perceptions that they were a differ-
ent product, and the presence of specialized dealers for each of
these two tire categories. Prices for heavy tires were much
higher. The Court of Justice noted that supply substitutability
was limited because the technologies and equipment for manu-
facturing heavy tires and auto tires differed significantly. Re-
treads posed a more difficult issue, primarily because the Com-
mission recognized that at least some consumers viewed retreads
as interchangeable with new tires. But because a significant
number of consumers had concerns about their safety and relia-
bility, some volume of retreads were produced in response to
specific orders and did not therefore compete with new tires,
and retreads were a secondary market dependent upon the pri-
53. HAWK, supra note 28, at 763.
54. NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/81,
[19831 E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282.
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mary new tire market, retreads were not included in the mar-
ket.55 Finally, the Court of Justice declined to break the heavy
tire market into further categories based on types and dimen-
sions, finding that these differences were not relevant to the de-
mands of distributors who carried a full line, even though they
might be relevant to consumers. The decision has been criti-
cized on a number of grounds, which are not repeated here.56 It
is of import, however, because many of the factors relied upon,
including cross-elasticity studies, price differences, consumer
perceptions, and differing distribution methods, all play a role in
subsequent cases. The Court of Justice's conclusion that the sale
of identical products to vehicle manufacturers and for replace-
ment markets is well-ingrained in EC law. This is true even in
cases under the Merger Regulation where the Michelin distinc-
tion has been maintained, particularly in a large number of cases
involving various auto parts and equipment, often with little dis-
cussion beyond citation of Michelin.
These four Article 86 cases have set the general standards
applied in cases involving issues of product substitutability. With
the exception of Continental Can, supply substitutability played
little role in the Court of Justice's analysis, nor, as we shall see,
has it in more recent cases. Demand substitutability was mea-
sured in large part on physical and technical characteristics, with
price differences, cross-elasticity of demand, and distribution dif-
ferences also playing a role, primarily to confirm what the physi-
cal characteristics analysis seemed to indicate. United Brands,
Hoffman-LaRoche; and Michelin also defined markets in terms of
end uses, even when products were physically identical, without
inquiry into the ability of the seller to segregate particular end
users with respect to price.
The most troublesome of the early decisions of both the
Commission and the Court of Justice involved findings of abuse
in vertical relationships, primarily cases involving refusals to deal
55. See Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 416 (providing similar analysis con-
cluding that reprocessed secondary aluminum ingot was not in same market as virgin
aluminum ingot).
56. See HAWK, supra note 28, at 763; Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions,
Goals, and Dominant Undertakings: The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the
European Union, 64 ANTITRUST LJ. 443, 473-75 (1996).
57. See Commission Decision No. 88/518/EEC, O.J. L 284/41 (1988), [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 196 (Napier Brown-British Sugar).
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with distributors or, in some cases, competing manufacturers. In
Hugin/Liptons,5  a manufacturer of cash registers was held in vio-
lation of Article 86 for refusing to supply spare parts for its own
machines to a former distributor who was also engaged in repair
and reconditioning of cash registers. No one else manufactured
parts for Hugin machines. The Commission concluded, as did
the Court of Justice, that no other parts were interchangeable
with Hugin parts, at least with respect to use on Hugin machines.
Hugin thus held a dominant position with respect to parts for its
own machines.59 U.S. commentators have sharply criticized the
Commission's use of such a single brand market.6" While
Hugin/Liptons bears a superficial similarity to the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Kodak,61 the analysis in Kodak was far
more complex and left the outcome in doubt.6 2 Hugin/Liptons is
best understood as a decision not based on economic concerns,
but on concerns over fairness to buyers dependent on a supply
that the Commission and the Court ofJustice wished to preserve
in the market place. The market definition was carefully tai-
lored to this end. 63
The definition of product markets in the setting of vertical
58. Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, Case 22/78, [1979] E.C.R. 1869,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 345.
59. See Commission Decision No. 77/327/EEC, OJ. L 117/1 (1977), [1977] 2
C.M.L.R. DI (ABG Oil Companies), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. BP v. Commission,
[1978] E.C.R. 1513.
60. See, e.g., Thomas E. Kauper, Article 86, Excessive Prices, and Refusals to Deal, 59
ANTITRUST L.J. 441, 451 (1991).
61. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
62. In Kodak, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the question of whether parts and
service for Kodak brand copying equipment constituted relevant markets for the pur-
pose of tying and monopolization claims could not be resolved on a motion for sum-
mary judgement. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion only after a detailed
analysis of the claim that purchasers were "locked-in" to the machines and the parts and
service that they required.
63. Hugin/Liptons might be viewed as a so-called "lock-in" case. In Hugin/Liptons
after an initial investment in a cash register, buyers could not easily switch to another
make of cash register and thus were required to use Hugin parts. The Commission did
not approach the case in this way, and it made no analysis of the difficulty of switching.
The Commission did make such an argument in Societe Alsacienne et Lorraine de Telecom-
munications et d'Electronique v. SA Novasam. Case 247/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5987, [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 434 (contending that consumers who had elected to rent rather than
purchase telephone equipment were confined to local installers for maintenance). The
Court of Justice summarily rejected the argument.
EC COMPETITION LAW
integration was at issue in both Commercial Solvents64 and ECS/
AKZO.65 In both cases, the firm in question was dominant in
one market, but the effects of its conduct were felt in another.
In one sense, the critical issue was to determine the market in
which dominance was found, rather than how to define such a
market. Commercial Solvents produced a raw material, ami-
nobutonal, which was used to produce ethambutol, an anti-
tuberculosis drug. Aminobutonal also was used as a paint emul-
sifier. Commercial Solvents had supplied the raw material to
Zoja, a competing manufacturer of ethambutol. Zoja found it
could obtain aminobutonol from paint manufacturers who
purchased it from Commercial Solvents at a lower price. Com-
mercial Solvents forbade its paint manufacturer buyers from sell-
ing to Zoja and refused to do so itself, on the ground that it was
going to use the material to produce the drug internally. The
Court of Justice defined the market as the raw material rather
than ethambutol, where, arguably, there were significant com-
petitors. There was no other raw material substitute for produc-
ing the drug.
The facts in ECS/AKZO were similar. AKZO produced a
chemical that was used both in producing flour additives and as
a plastics catalyst. ECS produced the same chemical, which it
sold as a flour additive. After it sought to expand its sales of the
base chemical to plastic manufacturers, AKZO retaliated by
sharply reducing its prices to ECS's flour manufacturer custom-
ers, resulting in a charge of violating Article 86. As in Commercial
Solvents, the market was defined at the raw material level. While
these cases are often characterized as market definition cases,
they really turn on identifying the level at which the market was
defined. Both decisions stand for the proposition that, where a
firm has a dominant position in an upstream market, use of that
power in a downstream market may be an abuse without estab-
lishing dominance in the latter market.66
64. Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA v. Commission (Commercial Solvents),
Joined Cases 6-7/73, [1974] E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309.
65. Akzo Chemie BV v. Commission, Case C-62/86, [1991] E.C.R. 1-3359, [1993] 5
C.M.L.R. 215 (upholding Commission Decision No. 85/609/EEC, OJ. L 374/1 (1985),
[1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 273).
66. See HAwK, supra note 28, at 768-72.
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2. Product Market Definition - 1989 to Date
In 1989 the Merger Regulation was adopted. By examining
decisions on market definition under Articles 85 and 86 begin-
ning at that time, the interplay between these decisions and
those under the Merger Regulation can be considered. It is
commonly asserted that decisions involving concentrations
under the Merger Regulation, which reflect the analysis of a sin-
gle administrative unit, the Merger Task Force, are a more co-
herent and cohesive whole than decisions under Articles 85 and
86, and that markets tend to be more narrowly defined in apply-
ing the former.67 Commentators have expressed the hope that
the analysis used in merger cases will influence market defini-
tions under Articles 85 and 86.68 While no conclusions are
drawn at this point, it should be noted that in non-merger cases
market definition has involved not only the Commission, but the
Court of Justice and Court of First Instance as well. The courts,
however, have had little to say so far with respect to market defi-
nition in merger cases. Greater coherence and consistency
might be expected where the process is in the hands of a single
group within the Commission.
The analysis that follows will consider first the problem of
substitute products. End use and brand name markets are then
discussed separately.
a. Substitute Products
Perhaps the most striking'and influential Court of Justice
opinion during this more recent period is Ahmed Saeed.69 It is
also one of the Court of Justice's most cryptic. At issue was the
validity of airline tariffs jointly proposed by airlines and ap-
proved by the German government. German law prohibited the
sale of tickets below these approved fares. After two travel agents
sold discounted tickets on a flight from Germany to interna-
tional destinations, suit was brought in German courts, which in
turn referred several questions to the Court of Justice. No dis-
cussion of the relevant market appears in its analysis under Arti-
cle 85. With respect to Article 86, the Court ofJustice noted that
67. KORAH, supra note 52, at 71-72;Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 57, at 462.
68. See KoRAH, supra note 52, at 72.
69. Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs
eV, Case 66/86, [1989] E.C.R. 803, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 102.
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two approaches to market definition had been suggested. The
market could be defined as scheduled air flights, or as a much
broader market consisting of charter flights, railways, highways,
and scheduled flights on other routes that consumers viewed as
substitutes. The Court of Justice then simply concluded that:
The test to be employed is whether the scheduled flight on a
particular route can be distinguished from the possible alter-
natives by virtue of specific characteristics as a result of which
it is not interchangeable with those alternatives and is af-
fected only to an insignificant degree by competition from
them. 70
The Court of Justice observed that its test might yield varying
results in different cases, noting that for some airline routes no
competition might exist, and that on some routes there might be
other routes that would serve as substitutes. 71 Nothing more was
said, which may not be surprising in a referral case. The Advo-
cate General, however, had concluded that scheduled flights
were a separate market, because the bulk of the demand for
scheduled flights came from "businessmen, government offi-
cials, and politicians," who need to travel at particular times of
day and for whom other modes of transport were not a substi-
tute.7 2 The geographic market, in his view, was defined as flights
between an airport in Germany and other Member States be-
cause the German Air Transport Law so defined it. If this is the
rationale underlying the Court of Justice's statements, it surely
raises more questions than it answers.73
On its face Ahmed Saeed seems to say little. Certainly it ex-
plains little. From this small seed, however, a mighty oak has
70. Id. at 849, 40, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 135.
71. The Court ofJustice did not rule out the possibility that, for some routes, sur-
face transport might be a reasonable substitute, although air route cases generally have
tended to define markets in terms of other air routes. But in Night Services, an Article 85
case involving joint agreements among European railroads for the operation of the
Channel Tunnel, two separate markets were defined. Commission Decision No. 94/
663/EC, OJ. L 259/20 (1994), [1995] 5 C.M.L.R. 76 [hereinafter Night Services]. For
business travelers, the market included high speed rail and air travel. The market for
leisure travelers was defined to include economy-class air travel, train, motor coach,
and, perhaps, even motor cars.
72. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Ahmed Saeed, [1989] E.C.R. at 824, 29,
[1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 114. Cf Night Services, OJ. L 259/20 (1994), [1995] 5 C.M.L.R.
76.
73. Why should market definition under Article 86, for example, turn on the defi-
nitions used in the German regulatory regime?
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grown. In British Midland,74 for example, the Commission con-
cluded that Aer Lingus, which had refused to interline passen-
gers with British Midland, held a dominant position in a market
defined as the sale of air transport between Dublin and
London's Heathrow airport. Ahmed Saeed was not cited, but was
clearly the underpinning of the Commission's decision. A more
detailed explanation was offered. Characteristics of surface
transport, including speed, convenience, and the need to trans-
fer, meant the market must be confined to air travel. Surface
transport was substitutable for some price-conscious travelers,
but many do not view surface and air travel as interchangeable.
Air fares were significantly higher than surface fares, and there
was no evidence the latter constrained the former. In geo-
graphic terms, the market was the specific Dublin route.7" While
some travelers might use a London airport other than
Heathrow, given that Dublin-Gatwick service was available, busi-
ness travelers prefer the convenience and interconnections avail-
able at Heathrow. This recitation by the Commission comes per-
ilously close to defining a market for business travel, as suggested
by the Advocate General in Ahmed Saeed and built into product
market definition in subsequent cases.7 6 Finally, supply-side sub-
stitutability was constrained by authorization requirements and a
lack of landing slot availability. This is at least some explanation,
although it is not entirely satisfying, particularly on the use of
but one London airport.
Ahmed Saeed has had an influence far beyond air transport
markets. In French-West African Shipowner's Committees,77 the Com-
mission found that cargo sharing and other agreements of a
shipowner's committee violated both Articles 85 and 86. Again,
market definition is discussed formally only in the Article 86
74. Commission Decision No. 92/213/EEC, O.J. L 96/34 (1992), [1993] 4
C.M.L.R. 596 [hereinafter British Midland].
75. While route designations may be viewed as a geographic market issue, it is
difficult to separate product and geographic markets in transport cases. These issues,
therefore, are discussed here.
76. See Night Service, OJ. L 259/20 (1994), [1995] 5 C.M.L.R. 76. Cf Commission
Notice, O.J. C 117/05 (1995) [hereinafter Havas Voyage/American Express] (advising
under Merger Regulation that markets for travel agency services should be divided be-
tween business and leisure travel). Note that airlines, through a variety of pricing tac-
tics, have been reasonably successful in discriminating in price between business and
leisure travelers.
77. French-West African Shipowners' Committees, O.J. L 134/1 (1992), [1993] 5
C.M.L.R. 322.
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analysis. Initially, the Commission defined the market as regular
liner cargo service, a market excluding air transport and
chartered tramp vessels. They did this for reasons similar to Ah-
med Saeed's exclusion of surface transport and air charter service.
More specifically, the Commission defined the market as liner
service between France and eleven African states, with little ex-
planation beyond the assertion that the logic of Ahmed Saeed ap-
plied to sea routes.
This chain of logic was extended once again in Sea Contain-
ers.78 Sea Containers, desiring to operate a vehicle and passen-
ger ferry service on a route between Holyhead in Wales and Dub-
lin and Dun Laoghaire in Ireland, was denied access to the port
of Holyhead by Sealink, which owned the port facilities and op-
erated as the port authority. Sealink also operated a ferry service
on the route Sea Containers sought to enter. The Commission
found that, while there were three ferry corridors between Great
Britain and Ireland, the corridors were not substitutes. The
northern and southern corridors brought passengers a consider-
able distance from Dublin and, therefore, were not interchange-
able in the eyes of consumers. It was then an easy step to con-
clude that the market was port services for the central corridor.
The only British port on the corridor was Holyhead, and Sealink,
therefore, held a dominant position. A similar result was
reached in Port of Rodby, 79 where the Commission concluded that
the Rodby-Pultgarden ferry route was a separate market, there
being no "straightforward alternative" in terms of other routes,
relying on Ahmed Saeed. DSB, an agency of the Danish govern-
ment and the owner of the port facilities at R0dby, therefore
held a dominant position. The Commission's decision was bol-
stered by a reference to the opinion of the Court ofJustice opin-
ion in Merci Convenzinali Porto di Genova,8" where the Court of
Justice, in a referral case from an Italian court, rather casually
indicated that the Port of Genoa was a market. The analysis in
these air and sea transport cases comes full circle with the Com-
mission's decision in a case dealing with landing fees at the Brus-
78. Commission Decision No. 94/19/EC, O.J. L 15/8 (1994) [hereinafter Sea
Containers].
79. Commission Regulation No. 421/94, O.J. L 55/22 (1994).
80. Merci Convenzionale Porto di Genova SpA v. Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA, Case
C-179/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5889, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 422.
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sels airport.8' Relying on both the Ahmed Saeed and Porto di Ge-
nova decisions, the Commission concluded that the relevant
market was services linked to the infrastructure at the Brussels
airport, finding that, for short- and medium-haul services to and
from Brussels, there was only a limited substitutability with other
routes.
These cases define markets in very narrow terms. The fact
that markets are narrow rather than broad does not in itself indi-
cate that market definitions are right or wrong. But in some of
these cases, narrow markets seem to be serving the particular
end of imposing public utility-like duties to provide access to fa-
cilities thought to be important to the public, and to do so as a
matter of EC law. This may reflect sound public policy, but it is
not necessarily a policy focused solely on competitive concerns.
These decisions are also of interest because of what they say
about the use of precedent. They rest on cryptic statements con-
tained in two Court of Justice cases that came to the Court of
Justice on referral of questions from national courts. Much has
been read into them, just as much has been read into rather
casual comments of the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, lest any-
one believe that the analysis under the Merger Regulation might
differ, it should be noted that the outcome in airline concentra-
tion cases has been no different, although the explanation has
been fuller.82
There have been a number of other cases concerned with
product substitutability. In those Article 85 cases where market
definition has been considered at all, the treatment of this issue
has been relatively terse. In Continental/Michelin3 for example,
the Commission simply pronounced that the market was "car
tires," and similarly pronounced the market to be world-wide.
The market in PM-DSV84 was described as the relaying of tele-
vised pictures and news of horse races for betting shop custom-
ers, excluding by simple fiat the relaying of greyhound races and
81. Commission Decision No. 95/364/EC, O.J. L 216/8 (1995) (Discount on
Landing Fees at Zaventum).
82. See Commission Notice, 0.J. C 232/06 (1992) [hereinafter Air France/
Sabena]; Commission Decision No. 4064/89/EEC, o.J. C 200/10 [hereinafter Swissair/
Sabena].
83. Commission Decision No. 88/555/EEC, 0J. L 305/33 (1988), [1989] 4
C.M.L.R. 920 [hereinafter Continental/Michelin].
84. Commission Decision No. 95/373/EC, 0.J. L 221/34 (1995) (PMI-DSV).
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other sporting events, a conclusion that, at least to a non-bettor,
does not seem obvious. In several Article 85 cases, effects have
been measured in market "segments" without further evaluation
of markets. For example, in Fiat/Hitachi,85 a joint venture for
the manufacture of hydraulic excavations was evaluated in the
hydraulic excavation "subsector" of a broader earthmoving
equipment market. 86 These cases confirm that market defini-
tion is seldom a critical factor in Article 85 analysis. Virtually all
major market definition cases continue to arise under Article 86
or the Merger Regulation.
Even under Article 86, market definition issues are occa-
sionally handled more by pronouncement than analysis. In
Warner-Lambert/Gilette,7 for example, the market was defined as
wet shaving products with the simple statement that users of wet
shaving products do not consider dry shaving products "suffi-
ciently close substitutes to form part of the same market." And
in the much celebrated British Plasterboard (BPB) case,88 a case
involving a variety of forms of payments intended to bring about
what were in effect exclusive supply arrangements, the Commis-
sion concluded that the market was plasterboard, explaining
simply that because the conduct at issue related to and was di-
rected at plasterboard manufacturers, the market a priori should
be so defined. The argument that wet plaster was a cost-effective
alternative and should be included in the market was rejected
because competition from wet plaster could be, and was, consid-
ered in evaluating dominance. This approach may seem to con-
tradict normal principles of market definition but seems sensi-
ble. For many applications, plasterboard and wet plaster were
found to be of limited interchangeability. The Commission thus
concluded that competition from wet plaster, while not irrele-
vant, should not be given the same weight it would be given if it
were simply included in the market.
85. Commission Decision No. 93/48/EEC, O.J. L 20/10 (1993) (Fiat/Hitachi).
86. See also Commission Decision No. 93/49/EEC, O.J. L 20/14 (1993), [1993] 5
C.M.L.R. 617 (Ford/Volkswagen) (analyzing joint venture to produce new vehicle in
minivan market segment).
87. Commission Decision No. 93/252/EEC, O.J. L 116/21 (1993) [1993] 5
C.M.L.R. 559 (Warner-Lambert/Gillette).
88. Commission Decision No. 89/22/EEC, O.J. L 10/50 (1989), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R.
464 (British Plasterboard (BPB)); see BPB Industries Plc & Anor v. Commission, Case C-
310/93P, [1995] I E.C.R. 865, [1995] 2 C.E.C. 15 (upholding Commission's decision
without discussion of product market).
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There have been three cases of particular significance with
respect to the inclusion of substitute products in product mar-
kets since 1989. The decisions in Langanese-Iglo9 and Hilti90 are
discussed subsequently in dealing with markets in vertical cases
and single brand markets. The third is Tetra Pak 11.91 Tetra Pak
is virtually the sole producer in the Community of machines for
the aseptic packaging of liquid foods and the cartons used in
such packaging. It was found to have abused its position in these
markets through the use of restrictive sales conditions, tying ar-
rangements, and discriminatory pricing. Tetra Pak also had a
large market share in the market, as the Commission defined it,
for machines and cartons used in packaging liquid foods in a
non-aseptic manner. The Commission defined four markets as
machines for aseptic packaging of ultra-high temperature
treated liquid foods, primarily milk, cartons for the same, ma-
chines for packaging liquid foods in cartons in a non-aseptic
manner, and cartons for the same. While it concluded that mar-
ket shares in both aseptic and non-aseptic markets were suffi-
ciently high to find dominance in each, it concluded that such
an approach ignored links between them. Milk and fruit juice
are packaged both ways, often by the same producers. In these
circumstances, it was appropriate to find that conduct affecting
the non-aseptic markets constituted an abuse of its aseptic mar-
ket position.
Tetra Pak argued that the market should include a variety of
other forms of packaging, such as glass and plastic bottles. The
Commission concluded that such packaging competes at best in
the long-term, given their different physical characteristics, user
needs, and the differences in the machinery used in the packag-
ing process. "In the short, and probably even the medium
term," however, the elasticity of substitution in response to
prices "is almost zero," for two reasons.9" First, packaging is but
a very small part of the price of the packaged product, so even a
ten percent price increase would have little impact on the price
of the packaged product. Given consumer preferences, the
packager/producer will not shift to another form of packaging
89. Langanese-Iglo, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1533, [1995] 5 C.M.L.R. 602.
90. Hilti, T-30/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1439, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 16.
91. Tetra Pak, Case T-83/91, [1995] E.C.R. 11-755, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 726.
92. Commission Decision No. 92/163/EEC, O.J. L 72/1, at 17-18, 93 (1992),
[1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 551, 583 [hereinafter Tetra Pak II].
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only in response to consumer acceptability. There can, in the
Commission's words, be "no elasticity of intermediate demand if
there is no elasticity of final demand."93 Second, change-over by
producer/packagers to different equipment and packages is
both costly and time-consuming, and may require alteration in
storage, handling, and distribution systems.
For perhaps the first time, the Commission explained why
markets must be defined based on short time periods. Over the
long-term, consumer habits evolve, technology changes, and
market boundaries shift. A short time period corresponds more
to the period in which a company exercises its market power and
upon which, therefore, analysis must focus. The prevailing ap-
proach to market definition in the United States also uses rela-
tively short time periods.94 The time frame question will reap-
pear in the discussion of Merger Regulation decisions, where it
figures prominently in the discussion of transition problems.
In the Court of First Instance, the arguments in Tetra Pak II
grew yet more complex. It was argued that the Commission
should have approached market definition by looking separately
at packaging for different liquid food group, such as milk, or-
ange juice, etc. The Court of First Instance found that this ap-
proach was unwarranted, noting that whatever the product,
aseptic and non-aseptic systems each fulfilled the same need, in-
volved the same packager/producers in many cases, and, within
each type of system, prices were uniform, regardless of liquid.
Moreover, given the dominance of milk in each category, pack-
aging of milk alone could provide a reasonable basis for assess-
ing dominance. The Court of First Instance then agreed with
the Commission's findings on lack of sufficient substitutability
between aseptic and non-aseptic systems, noting, as the Commis-
sion stressed, that small increases in machinery prices would not
affect consumers' decision to shift between aseptic and non-asep-
tic milk. Tetra-Pak's claim that it was the packager/producer's
view that was critical and that they would switch even in response
to a very small increase was flatly rejected. In the end, the criti-
cal factors were those relied upon by the Commission, namely
93. Id. at 19, 97 [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 585.
94. The United States Merger Guidelines measure supply substitutability over a
period of one year. 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 1.32. Another potential
entry will be considered only if it is likely to occur within two years from initial planning
to significant impact. Id. § 3.2.
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differences in physical characteristics, consumer preferences
based on taste and shelf-life, and the costs inherent in shifting
from one system to another. The Court of First Instance also
rejected supply substitutability arguments, finding that manufac-
turers of non-aseptic machinery in cartons would not be able, at
least because of a lack of technological knowledge, to modify
their machinery to make it usable for aseptic packaging. The
same analysis was used in upholding the Commission's findings
that aseptic packaging in containers of glass and plastic was not
substitutable with aseptic packaging in cartons.
While much of the analysis in Tetra-Pak H reflects a conven-
tional assessment of physical and technological characteristics
and consumer needs and preferences, several things stand out.
First, the Commission's explicit reference to the time frame to
be used in assessing markets is noteworthy, even though it has
used short time periods implicitly for some time. Second, the
reliance on consumer demand as the critical element in con-
cluding that small increases in machinery prices would not cause
a shift in this intermediate market to other machinery types, an
assessment valid only if strong consumer preferences precluded
such a shift, could be significant in looking at a number of inter-
mediate markets. Third, the Commission and the Court of First
Instance did consider supply-side substitutability, although factu-
ally both concluded rather easily that it was not relevant. And
finally, the Commission and the Court of First Instance declined,
where machinery for aseptic packaging was basically the same for
all types of liquids packages, to segregate the market further
based on liquid type. In short, end user market definitions were
rejected, at least in part because there was no evidence of price
discrimination among the proposed user categories.
b. Identical Products with Different Uses and Buyers
Where product substitutability is at issue, different needs of
different buyers may establish that interchangeability between
products with different characteristics is low. But what of the
case where different buyers put the same product to different
uses? Should the market for a single product be further divided
based on use categories? In several early decisions, including
Michelin and Hoffman-LaRoche, the Court ofJustice and Commis-
sion appeared to adopt such definitions. In more recent cases,
however, markets have seldom been so defined. In Tetra-Pak II,
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the Court of Justice rejected end use definitions and distin-
guished Hoffman-LaRoche, stressing that the equipment used for
packaging milk and fruit juices was the same, that the packagers
of milk and orange juice were to some degree the same, and that
there was no evidence of price discrimination between milk and
orange juice producers. The implication is that end user mar-
kets are appropriate, if at all, only where the users, and the
prices charged different users, vary significantly, an approach
similar to that generally followed in the United States. On the
other hand, the Commission has continued to define separate
markets for sales of identical new vehicle parts to original equip-
ment manufacturers and for replacement purposes, a distinction
maintained under the Merger Regulation, and U.S. antitrust law
as well 95 without examination of prices.
In two cases dealing with exclusive supply arrangements
under Article 85, variations on end use markets are used. In De-
limitis v. Henninger Brau,96 a referral case, the Court of Justice
defined two separate markets for the sale of beer, even though
the beer itself was physically identical. Beer sold to public
houses for on-site consumption was defined as a market separate
from sales of the same product to the retail trade. The opinion
is typically terse, but the rationale seems to be that the different
modes of distribution entail different costs on the part of brew-
ers, with supply to public houses involving the provision of serv-
ices and on site installations not necessary for sales to the retail
trade. The Court of Justice also noted that prices through the
two channels were markedly different and, in a passage reflective
of the nature of beer drinkers, that "beer consumption in public
houses is not essentially dependent on economic considera-
tions, "9 7 The latter finding is critical, indicating that brewers
could raise prices on sales to public houses without any signifi-
cant shift by buyers of beer sold through retail outlets. If this is
true, public houses are a separate beer market.
Delimitis was in turn followed by the Court of First Instance
in Langanese-Iglo,98 another Article 85 case involving exclusive
supply arrangements, this time involving ice cream. The Com-
95. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
96. Delimitis v. Henninger Brau AG, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210.
97. Id. at 1-984, 16, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 246.
98. Langanese-Iglo, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1533, [1995] 5 C.M.L.R. 602.
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mission had found that the relevant product market was "indus-
trial impulse ice cream sold through all distribution channels"
except doorstep delivery services,99 a definition that seems to in-
clude only ice cream sold in prepared single serving packages.
Langanese argued that the market included all ice cream,
whether produced industrially or by the craft trade, 100 including
ice cream sold to bulk buying customers for scooping purposes.
From the consumers' point of view, all of these ice creams are
interchangeable to the impulse buyer. The Court of First In-
stance agreed with the Commission that place of consumption
was the critical element. Relying on Delimitis, it excluded from
the market ice cream sold through restaurants, which consti-
tuted a separate market because a different service was involved
and sales were less affected by economic considerations than
other types of sales, and take home sales of ice creams stored in
home freezers, which do not meet impulse buyers' needs and
are only interchangeable to a limited degree with products sold
in the street. "Multipacks" were properly excluded for the same
reason. The Court of First Instance also agreed with the exclu-
sion from the market of craft trade ice creams, which were
neither covered by the exclusive supply arrangements nor
sought by or offered to retailers. Ice cream sold in bulk for
scooping purposes posed a greater difficulty. The Commission
had excluded these sales because there was only a slight overlap
in distribution, the, need for an additional service, the serving of
portions taken from bulk, meant that industrial ice cream and
scooping ice cream were seldom offered together because most
industrial impulse ice cream was sold through grocery and spe-
cialized stores, and there were different product technologies in-
volved. The Court of First Instance disagreed with the Commis-
sion, finding industrial impulse and scooping ice cream fully in-
terchangeable from the consumers' point of view. Differences in
distribution, service, and technology did not affect consumer
choice. The Court of First Instance did not find the Commis-
sion's error relevant to its competitive analysis and, therefore,
did not annul the Commission's decision.
Langanese-Iglo is a difficult case to evaluate. The Court of
99. Id. at HI-1555, 44, [1995] 5 C.M.L.R. at 625.
100. The craft trade compromises all sales of ice cream on the street, at or near the
point of manufacture.
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First Instance clearly felt constrained by Delimitis in excluding
from the market all ice cream for other than immediate con-
sumption. Its treatment of craft ice cream is probably best ex-
plained by the fact that it was measuring the foreclosure effect of
exclusive supply arrangements. Vendors of craft ice cream were,
in its judgment, simply not outlets available to industrial ice
cream suppliers. And its willingness to challenge the Commis-
sion on scooping ice cream suggests that the Court of First In-
stance is willing to do more on market definition than simply
defer to the Commission. Its conclusion also seems clearly cor-
rect. Both Delimitis and Langanese-Iglo seem to reflect the use of
narrow use-oriented markets when vertical foreclosure effects
are at issue, and are best confined to such cases. They provide
little basis for concluding that end use differences standing
alone are sufficient to place identical products in separate mar-
kets.1 01
c. Single Brand Markets
In Hugin/Liptons, the Court of Justice defined the relevant
market as parts for Hugin cash registers. It returned to a single
brand market in Hilti AG v. Commission. Hilti manufactured
powder-actuated fastening ("PAF") guns, power tools that drive
nails with the use of an exploding cartridge that is inserted into
the gun along with the nails to be driven. Hilti produced not
only the guns themselves, but also the cartridge strips and nails
that were compatible with its guns. Acting on complaints by
competing manufacturers of Hilti-compatible nails, the Commis-
sion found that Hilti had violated Article 86 by refusing to pro-
vide cartridge strips without nails, and by taking a number of
other steps to assure that cartridge purchasers were required to
use cartridges only with Hilti nails. In essence, Hilti tied the
sales of cartridges and nails together. The Commission defined
three separate markets as nail guns, Hilti-compatible cartridge
strips, and Hilti-compatible nails. Hilti was found to be domi-
nant in each of these markets.
In the Court of First Instance, Hilti advanced two interre-
lated arguments. First, its gun, cartridges, and nails were a sin-
gle, integrated product. Second, as an integrated system, its
101. But see Night Services, O.J. L 259/20 (1994), [1995] 5 C.M.L.R. 76 (defining
transport markets in terms of classes of end users).
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product was interchangeable with a variety of other fastening sys-
tems, particularly drilling and screwing, which were therefore
part of the same market. The Court of First Instance rejected
both arguments. As to the second, the Court of First Instance
agreed with the Commission's determination that, in terms of
physical and technological characteristics, there was a low de-
gree of interchangeability between fastening systems for many
uses and that evidence of the coexistence of different fastening
forms with significant shares over a long period of time con-
firmed this fact. Hilti's arguments that its studies showed a high
degree of price elasticity was rejected on the facts. The holding
of the Court of First Instance was confirmed by the Court ofJus-
tice on the same grounds. 10 2 These grounds are questionable.
Because the Court of First Instance and the Commission found
that for a number of applications the PAF system was favored,
and for a number it was not, it is difficult to determine the actual
degree of substitutability that may have existed. That each of
several fastening systems held a significant part of overall fasten-
ing sales over a period of time may suggest that each system was
technically superior in particular systems, but does not negate
price responsiveness among them in the event of a significant
price increase.
Hilti also argued that there was a significant degree of sup-
ply substitutability between power drill and PAF gun manufactur-
ers, between PAF nails and other nails and screws, and between
cartridge strip manufacturers. The Court of First Instance did
not resolve any issue of supply substitutability. 10 3
The Court of First Instance also agreed that PAF guns and
Hilti-compatible cartridges and nails were three separate mar-
kets, not one integrated product. Hilti-compatible cartridges
and nails are produced by other producers, a fact that alone was
deemed to be "sound evidence" of separate markets. To regard
these elements as a single system would be "tantamount to per-
mitting producers of nail guns to exclude the use of consum-
ables other than their own branded products in their tools," 104
102. Hilti AG v. Commission, Case C-53/92P, [1994] E.C.R. 1-667, [1994] 4
C.M.L.R. 614.
103. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Hilti, [1991] E.C.R. at 11-1439, II-
1461, 31, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 16, 30 (discussing at some length supply sub-
stitutability). The issue was not raised in the Court ofJustice.
104. Hilti, [1991] E.C.R. at 11-1473, 68, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. at 38-39.
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contrary to the right under EC competition law for any producer
to produce such consumables. This is frank recognition of the
use of market definition to reach a particular result. Having so
defined the markets in question, the Court of First Instance
rested its finding of dominance on Hilti's share of the market for
Hilti-compatible nails. This is curious to those familiar with
American law with respect to tying, for it seems to put the mar-
ket power focus on the tied product. The single brand market
definition, therefore, was critical.
Hilti expands upon Hugin/Liptons, where the Commission
emphasized that the parties seeking spare parts were not the
owners of the cash registers, but third parties. The Court ofJus-
tice concluded that its judgment in Hugin/Liptons did not pre-
clude a finding that equipment and consumables might also be
separate markets. A branded market now has been found in the
consumables case as well.
Hilti is in a sense a vertical case, not unlike the exclusive
supply decisions in Delimitis and Langanese-Iglo, and, therefore,
like these decisions, has no counterpart in decisions involving
horizontal concentrations under the Merger Regulation.1 °5 Hilti
involves abuse through refusals to deal and thus involves the
same policy concerns over such refusals that were apparent in
Hugin/Liptons. In addition, it involves a market definition care-
fully tailored to reach a particular result. It is not a case from
which to generalize.
d. Supply Substitutability
Despite the Court of Justice's holding in Continental Can
and the references in several other early cases to the assessment
of supply substitutability in defining product markets, there is
little in recent cases concerning supply substitutability. In Tetra
Pak II supply-side arguments were rejected factually. While the
supply-side was discussed by the Commission, and more fully by
the Advocate General in Hilti, neither the Court of First Instance
nor the Court ofJustice referred to the supply-side. In no recent
case has supply-side considerations impacted market definition.
Markets have been consistently defined on the basis of demand
considerations alone. To the extent considered at all, supply
105. Single brand markets have not been employed in horizontal cases.
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substitutability has been treated, along with longer term poten-
tial competition, as part of the assessment of competitive effects.
B. The Definition of Geographic Markets
Every relevant market includes a geographic market for the
obvious reason that firms selling in mutually exclusive geo-
graphic areas are not in competition and do not serve to limit
the ability of each other to increase price significantly. Geo-
graphic market definition involves the identification of those
firms, selling the products within the relevant product market, to
which customers in the area will turn in the event of a significant
price increase, and may also include firms that would enter the
geographic area in response to such an increase. Cases under
Articles 85 and 86 speak in terms of areas where the "conditions
of competition are homogeneous. " 106
Article 86 applies to firms holding a dominant position
"within the common market or in a substantial part of it." This
language presents a subsidiary issue, because it is possible that a
properly defined geographic market may not be "a substantial
part" of the Common Market. Logically, this is a separate ques-
tion. But, as Professor Hawk has noted, this requirement may
affect market definition by bringing about a reluctance to define
markets in term of regions within a single Member State,1" 7 a
reluctance which a detailed review of Court of Justice and Com-
mission decisions clearly reflects. In most cases where geo-
graphic market definition has been at issue, the focus has been
on whether the market is world-wide, an area covering more
than one Member State, or national, recognizing that in a few
cases, particularly those involving retailing, the market is obvi-
ously local. In its early decisions the Commission and Court of
Justice reflected a strong tendency to define markets as national,
a result consistent with recognition of the barriers between
Member States that were a part of the reason for the Commu-
nity's creation. Over time, this tendency has become less obvi-
ous, particularly in cases under the Merger Regulation, but in
Article 86 cases as well.
106. United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. at 274, 39, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 484.
107. HAwK, supra note 26, at 778.
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1. The Early Cases
In Suiker Unie,1°8 one of its earliest Article 86 cases, the
Court of Justice defined the relevant geographic markets for the
sale of sugar as Belgium, Luxembourg, and the southern part of
Germany. While some emphasis was placed on high freight rates
and the buying habits of processors, driven in part by their need
for regular deliveries, emphasis seemed to be placed primarily
on the allegedly abusive conduct itself as a measure of the mar-
ket. Defining geographic markets by reference to the area
where the conduct at issue occurred tends of course to make
markets self-defining.
The market definition in United Brands°9 was all of the
Community, less Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. The
conditions of competition in these three countries were viewed
as different because of discriminatory quotas and import prefer-
ences in each. While there were non-discriminatory tariffs and
differences in transport costs in the remaining Member States,
conditions of competition were effectively the same throughout
the whole area. United Brands was allegedly unaffected by trans-
port costs, selling in the six country area on a free-on-board
("f.o.b.") basis from two ports. Trade barriers, a conventional
element in defining geographic markets, were the critical factor.
The Court of Justice again dealt with geographic market
definition in the Michelin case, 110 a far more controversial deci-
sion than United Brands. Michelin sold tires in the Netherlands
using a system of fidelity rebates. The Commission had found
that Michelin abused a dominant position in the market for
heavy vehicle tires in the Netherlands even though Michelin and
a number of its competitors sold tires throughout the Commu-
nity, if not the world. The Commission emphasized that Miche-
lin sold in the Netherlands through a Netherlands sales subsidi-
ary, and that it was there that the practices took place. Tire deal-
ers in the Netherlands, moreover, could not obtain Michelin
tires from other Michelin subsidiaries and therefore could buy
only from other retailers, a source of supply insufficiently relia-
108. Suiker Unie v. Commission, Joined Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113-114/73,
[1975] E.C.R. 1663, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 295.
109. United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. at 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. at 429.
110. Commission Decision No. 81/969/EEC, O.J. L 353/33 (1981), [1982] 1
C.M.LR. 643 [hereinafter Michelin], affd sub nom., NV Nederlandsche Bandenindus-
trie Michelin v. Commission, Case 322/81, [1983] E.C.R. 3461, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 282.
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ble to meet their needs. Dealers were dependent on Michelin
tires to maintain prestige. Without them, sales would be lost.
The Commission thus came perilously close to defining the
product market as Michelin tires.
The Court of Justice accepted this market definition,
stressing that the decision was addressed to Michelin's subsidi-
ary, a fact that on its face seems irrelevant to market definition,
and adding that Michelin's major competitors also operated
through national sales subsidiaries, adapting to the conditions in
each national market. Buyers in the Netherlands, moreover,
generally obtained tires only from suppliers in the Netherlands.
The decision in Michelin contains no analysis of transport
costs or cross-elasticity of supply factors. It has been severely crit-
icized for its failure to do so and because of its almost single-
minded reliance on the use of national marketing organiza-
tions. 11' While the organization of distribution on a national ba-
sis may be indicative of other facts upon which a finding of na-
tional markets could be based,112 standing alone and without
further explanation it is not compelling. The Commission's ap-
parent concern with the dependence of dealers on Michelin's
sales subsidiary may be the most revealing element in the analy-
sis, suggesting that the substantive concern may have been abuse
of a dependent relationship rather than an economic concern
with the effects of market power. 113
Because geographic markets often were uncontested, there
are not many relevant cases in the early period. In those cases
where there was a real issue, the analysis of both the Commission
and the Court of Justice was relatively brief and conclusory.
Many of the fundamental elements later applied, such as high
transport costs, legal and regulatory barriers, and sales data
showing penetration of different areas, were identified and em-
ployed." 4 These decisions, and other Commission decisions in
these earlier years, are in some respects unconvincing and sug-
111. See, e.g., HAWK, supra note 26, at 782-83; Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 56, at
467-68.
112. A firm might use national sales subsidiaries, for example, in recognition of
different legal or regulatory environments. A firm might also use national procure-
ment policies, which might themselves indicate that markets are national.
113. See ABG Oil Companies, O.J. L 117/1, at 11 (1977), [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. Dl, at
D14.
114. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 231/2 (1986) (enumerating key factors).
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gestive of the use of market definition as an element in imple-
menting substantive policies that are not measured in economic
efficiency terms. In more recent years, the principles of geo-
graphic market definition have become more refined, particu-
larly in cases under the Merger Regulation. There have been
important decisions in the post-1988 period under Articles 85
and 86 as well.
2. The Post-1988 Decisions
The narrowest market definitions in these recent cases are
in the transport markets already discussed, definitions that seem
to be designed, in some cases at least, for application of the es-
sential facility doctrine.
There are also, of course, cases where opinions are particu-
larly cryptic and some further explanation seems necessary. In
Continental/Michelin,1 5 a case involving a notified cooperation
agreement for development of a new tire-wheel system, for ex-
ample, the Commission simply begins with the assertion that the
tire market is world-wide. Given its earlier Michelin decision, this
statement begs for some explanation. Was this definition simply
not contested? Is a different standard to be applied under Arti-
cle 85 than under Article 86, or because this involved a joint
venture unrelated to conduct involving distributors? There is no
way to know. Similarly, in Delimitis116 the Court of Justice, re-
sponding to a series of questions on referral from a German
court concerning exclusive beer supply agreements, defined the
relevant market as national, without elaboration other than to
note that "most beer supply agreements are still entered into at a
national level." The explanation seems insufficient without
some further assessment of the market conditions that underlie
the use of such agreements on a national basis. In Langanese-
Iglo,11 the ice cream exclusive supply case, the Commission re-
lied on Delimitis in concluding that the market, was Germany, for
the same reason. It gave a brief further explanation. National
peculiarities were reflected in different consumer brand prefer-
ences, prices, and assortments. Finally, the standards for ice
115. Continental/Michelin, OJ. L 305/33 (1988), [1989] 4 C.M.L.R. 920.
116. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing definition of markets for
sale of beer).
117. Langanese-Iglo, [1995] E.C.R. H-1533, [1995] 5 C.M.L.R. 602.
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cream manufacture were not yet harmonized. Given the differ-
ences in governing product standards, it is hard to quarrel with
the Commission's conclusion in the absence of evidence that the
barrier the standards create could be readily overcome by firms
currently outside Germany.
The cases discussed in the preceding paragraph are all Arti-
cle 85 cases. Delimitis and Langanese-Iglo are vertical foreclosure
cases, which may to some degree explain why the Court of Jus-
tice and the Commission defined the markets in terms of the
scope of the exclusive supply agreements, although assessment
of foreclosure in such cases might normally be based on a deter-
mination of the area served by firms to which customers covered
by the agreements could otherwise turn for supply. Most Article
85 decisions in which geographic markets are discussed at all
tend to do so in conclusory terms, with the primary focus on the
competitive effects analysis. The result can be confusing, as it
was in UIP,'1 a case involving ajoint distribution and licensing
venture between several American motion picture producers
and distributors. The Commission defined the geographic mar-
ket as the Community, because it was concerned only with effects
in the Community. It went on to indicate that because of varying
cinematographic environments, it would analyze the ventures ef-
fects "on the concept of a Community market made up of sub-
markets corresponding to the various Member States." '119 In Ar-
ticle 86 cases, where the analysis of dominant position starts with
and depends heavily on market definition, more care seems to
be taken, at least in explanation, and more guidance is given.
Seldom do these decisions rest on any single factor.
In British Plasterboard (BPB), ° the Commission measured
dominance in the sales of plasterboard in two geographic mar-
118. Commission Decision No. 89/467/EEC, O.J. L 226/25 (1989), [1990] 4
C.M.L.R. 749 [hereinafter UIP].
119. Id. at 30, 1 38, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. at 759. A somewhat more detailed analysis
is set forth in UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange, an Article 85 case involving a
detailed information exchange among competitors. Commission Decision No. 92/
157/EEC, O.J. L 68/19 (1992), [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 358 [hereinafter UK Agricultural
Tractor Registration Exchange]. The Commission defined the market for tractors as
the United Kingdom, even though over fifty percent of the tractors sold there were
made elsewhere in the Community. Because the suppliers were the same in each coun-
try, imports into the United Kingdom could be controlled. The need for local distribu-
tion and service was a significant entry barrier.
120. British Plasterboard (BPB), O.J. L 10/50 (1989), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 464.
EC COMPETITION LAW
kets, Great Britain and Ireland. Transport costs were high, mak-
ing it uneconomic to supply from abroad on a large scale. Im-
porters were unable to meet buyers' needs for regular supplies
across a wide range of products. For the same reasons, Great
Britain and Ireland were not a single market. BPB was the sole
producer in both markets. It did not supply one country from
the other, and re-export of imports was uneconomic. The deci-
sion is straightforward. The reliance on both transport costs and
lack of imports is convincing.
Geographic market definition was also at issue in Hilti,1 2 1
the nail gun case. In the Court of First Instance, Hilti contended
that markets were national, on the grounds that there were sub-
stantial price differences from country to country that were not
the result of barriers created by private firms, but reflected dif-
ferences in evaluation of a variety of fastening systems and in
other structural elements in each country. The Court of First
Instance was brief and to the point. There were substantial price
differences. Transport costs were low. Thus, parallel trading be-
tween countries was likely, and the market should be defined as
Community-wide. Brief as the analysis is, it is important, given
the manner in which price disparities have sometimes been
taken, as indicative of separate markets. The Merger Regulation
itself refers to "substantial price differences" in this manner, as
do some early merger decisions. In Hilti, on the other hand,
they were used to suggest the likelihood of parallel trading and
as evidence therefore of Community-wide trading. It is worth
noting, however, that more recent merger decisions have given
price differences standing alone less weight, and that this may be
the result of Hilti.
Italian Flat Glass,'2 2 a case where markets were defined in
the application of Article 86 but not Article 85, is another exam-
ple where the relevant market, for flat glass, was found to be
national, specifically Italy. The Commission concluded that
plant location was "a vital factor." '23 While transport costs were
not "an insurmountable obstacle" to imports, competitiveness
decreased as the distance from production plants to buyers in-
121. Hilti, [1991] E.C.R. 11-1439, [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. 16.
122. Commission Decision No. 89/93/EEC, OJ. L 33/44 (1988) [hereinafter Ital-
ian Flat Glass]. The Court of First Instance later upheld this decision. Societa Italiana
Vetro SpA, [1992] E.C.R. at 11-1403, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. at 302.
123. Italian Flat Glass, O.J. L 33/44, 77 (1988).
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creased. So while major producers exported, they did so in lim-
ited quantities because it was only profitable to do so for quanti-
ties produced at marginal cost. Local producers therefore faced
only limited competition. Because most suppliers with plants
outside Italy were controlled by the same groups to which Italian
producers belonged, the risk of outside competition was even
less. For customers needing regular supply, purchases must be
made within Italy.
There are weaknesses in the Commission's approach that
are exposed by its own arguments in the Court of First Instance.
It urged that market definition must be based on actual product
movements, not those "theoretically possible." Because eighty
percent of Italian flat glass consumption was supplied by produ-
cers in Italy, there could be "no doubt" that the geographic mar-
ket was Italy. But market definition must to some degree take
into account future probabilities. The existing situation may
simply reflect an equilibrium when prices in Italy were at com-
petitive levels and does not necessarily speak to consumer and
supplier responses to a significant price increase. Twenty per-
cent of sales were already coming from outside. The Court of
First Instance annulled that part of the Commission's decision
based on Article 86 but did not resolve questions of market defi-
nition. It was troubled, however, by the geographic market defi-
nition, noting that documents indicated that Italian producers
took account of competition from Benelux countries, Eastern
Europe, and Turkey, and that it would have been "useful" for the
Commission to have evaluated the effect of distance between
these points and Italy.1 24
In Tetra Pak II, the Commission had defined the markets for
milk packaging machinery as Community-wide because such ma-
chines were sold in each Member State and transport costs were
low. Price differences among Member States were not taken as
evidence of national markets, but were attributable to either mo-
nopoly or artificial partitioning of markets. Before the Court of
First Instance, Tetra Pak argued that the markets were national
124. In contrast, under the Merger Regulation, the Commission in Pithington-
Techint/SIV evaluated a joint venture for the production of float glass, the most com-
mon type of flat glass, in a Community-wide market. Commission Decision No. 94/
359/EC, O.J. L 158/24 (1994). It found that while float glass could only be transported
some five hundred kilometers from each plant, the number and location of plants
made it appropriate to define the market as the Community.
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because distribution was organized through national subsidiaries
and patterns of consumptions and prices varied between states.
The Court of First Instance agreed with the Commission and its
reasoning. Price differences resulted from artificial partitioning
of markets by Tetra Pak and others and, therefore, were not in-
dicative of different conditions of competition. For the same
reason, a pattern of purchasing at local levels was not relevant.
Finally, no weight was given to the use of national subsidiaries,
which was attributable to Tetra Pak's group-wide strategy of par-
titioning markets. The decision of the Court of Justice in Miche-
lin, where considerable weight was given to the use of such sub-
sidiaries, was distinguished because there the national subsidiar-
ies operated autonomously with policies reflecting national
market conditions. What is of note in Tetra Pak II is the Court of
First Instance's unwillingness to give weight to different price
levels and the use of national sales subsidiaries without examina-
tion of their underlying causes. It also is reflective of the increas-
ing tendency to define markets as Community-wide.' 25
The relationship between overlapping local markets was at
issue in Cement,12 6 a complex Article 85 case involving price fix-
ing, information exchanges, and related agreements. The Com-
mission defined geographic markets as a set of overlapping mar-
kets centered on particular factories, based on an analysis of
plant size and capacity, transport costs, and prices. There was a
low level of intra-Community trade, but the Commission noted
that the low level of exports between areas does not mean there
could not be a high level of exports, a position that appears in-
consistent with the position it took in Italian Flat Glass. The
Commission observed that any offer to supply this homogeneous
product, even if in only limited amounts, at a price "even slightly
lower" than a local producer, could create pressure to lower
prices. Exports can occur if the exporter can get higher prices
in another area than at home. Given the wide range of price
differences over a long period, export could be profitable. In a
125. The Court of Justice in Tetra Pak H also ruled in summary fashion that the
market did not extend to states that acceded to the EC during the relevant time period.
Tetra Pak II, O.J. L 72/1, at 18, 1 97 (1992), [1992] 4 C.M.L.R at 585. In Exxon/Shell,
another joint venture case, the Commission declined to extend a Community-wide mar-
ket to EFTA countries because there was virtually no existing level of imports or exports
between EC Member States and those countries. Exxon/Shell, O.J. L 144/20.(1994).
126. Cement, O.J. L 343/1 (1994).
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remarkable passage, the Commission then discusses the rele-
vance of game theory to exporters' decisions to sell into an oli-
gopoly market, where responses and retaliatory actions might be
taken, concluding that the existence of geographically separate
markets is not a "decisive obstacle" to competition from neigh-
boring markets. Because actions in one market may impact
more distant markets, the relevant geographic market was Eu-
rope. With its emphasis on likely responses, Cement shifts from
the static focus of Italian Flat Glass and similar decisions, sug-
gesting that the Commission's analysis even in non-merger cases
is moving closer to the American approach. Hilti seems to re-
flect a different view of geographic price variations than earlier
decisions. The decision in Tetra Pak II also marks a departure
from the mechanical analysis of Michelin. In geographic market
cases, as in those involving product markets, the influence of the
Court of First Instance is becoming apparent. The Commission
may be expected to be more careful in its findings as a result.
II. MARKET DEFINITION UNDER THE MERGER REGULATION
Definition of the relevant market in both product and geo-
graphic terms is an essential part of the Commission's substan-
tive analysis in every case under the Merger Regulation.' 27 As a
mechanical matter, virtually every merger and joint venture noti-
fication or decision under the regulation contains an identified
section on the product market and another on the geographic
market. Indeed, there appears to be a standard format followed,
almost in a "fill-in-the-blanks" sense.
With well over three hundred decisions and published noti-
fications to the parties, there is a lot for the analyst to consider.
This is a much higher number of concentration matters with
published outcomes than have been published in the United
States over a much longer period of time. The reason is simple.
Unlike the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission,
the Commission advises the parties who notified it of the pro-
posed transaction of the outcome of its analysis when it con-
cludes, upon consideration of the notification and accompany-
ing submissions, that the transaction "does not raise any serious
127. Council Regulation No. 4064/89, O.J. L 257/14 (1990); see Philip Lowe, Re-
cent Developments in Merger Control, in 1994 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 139 (Barry Hawk ed.,
1995) (examining some recent decisions also discussed in this Article).
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doubts as to its compatibility with the common market," that is,
that it will not initiate a full proceeding. 12 As part of this com-
munication, the Commission includes a relatively detailed com-
petitive analysis. This gives to the process a transparency, lack-
ing in the United States, for which the Commission is to be com-
mended. Having said that, however, it is also the case that many
of these not incompatible advisories provide less guidance to the
Commission's thinking than the far more detailed opinions is-
sued after the formal initiation of proceedings under Article 6,
Section 1 (c) of the Merger Regulation, many of which also con-
clude that the transaction is compatible with the Common Mar-
ket. A very high percentage of the notifications issued without
the initiation of proceedings follow a standard approach, which
perhaps already can be described as "classic," with respect to
market definition. While recognizing, and in some cases discuss-
ing, market definition issues raised by the parties or the Commis-
sion, the notification concludes that these issues need not be re-
solved because, even assuming the most narrow market defini-
tions, the market shares are not high enough to suggest that the
transaction presents serious competitive issues within the mean-
ing of the Merger Regulation.129 This is a highly efficient way of
proceeding, particularly given the time constraints within which
the Commission must decide whether to initiate proceedings,130
but means that many of these notifications contain relatively
summary and often unilluminating analysis.
Lawyers handling merger matters also need to be aware that
for a number of markets, definitions have already been estab-
lished. The Commission, unfettered by private cases decided in
other fora and, so far, with little direction on market definition
matters by the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice,
which in Articles 85 and 86 cases has tended to defer to the
128. The Commission's decisions and notifications to parties without formal pro-
ceedings are published in EEC Merger Control Reporter (Kluwer 1996) (4 volumes).
Decisions after full proceedings are cited to OJ. L. Notifications to parties are cited
with case number and date.
129. There are scores of such decisions. See generally Commission Notice, O.J. C
178/15 (1994) [hereinafter Daimler Benz/RWE]; Commission Notice, O.J. C 228/6
(1992) [hereinafter Pepsico/General Mills].
130. Under the Merger Regulation, the Commission must make the decision to
initiate proceedings within one month of receipt of the notification from the parties.
Commission Regulation No. 4064/89, supra note 127, art. 10(1), O.J. L 257/14, at 20
(1990).
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Commission on these questions anyway, has developed its own
set of precedents with respect to particular products and geo-
graphic markets. These precedents are likely to govern in subse-
quent cases. It is therefore critical to know when the Commis-
sion is likely simply to rely on the fact that it has already ex-
amined and defined the markets at issue. This is particularly
true where the Commission has already considered particular
markets on a number of occasions. Although the Commission
has departed from prior decisions dealing with particular mar-
kets,131 it is not likely to do so. A few illustrations may be useful.
In dealing with products sold to the military, geographic
markets are generally defined as national in those cases where
the Member State has domestic producers, largely because of de-
fense agency buying preferences. Where the same product is
sold for civil uses, or where it is sold to Member States without
domestic producers, the market may be either Community-wide,
or more commonly, world-wide.132 The product market in food
retailing is defined in four classes, including small specialty
shops, such as bakers, butchers, etc., small neighborhood stores
of under four hundred square meters, supermarkets and
hypermarkets of over four hundred square meters, and discount
stores. 133 Geographic markets generally are defined in terms of
a radius of twenty minutes driving time, with recognition that
because these market circles overlap it is appropriate to define
the geographic markets as departments. 134 Pharmaceutical mar-
kets are defined using the third level of the Anatomical Thera-
peutic Classifications ("ATC") of the World Health Organization
("WHO"). Geographically, pharmaceutical markets are na-
tional, primarily because of the legal and regulatory framework
still present in Member States, a definition that the Commission
131. In Renault/Heuliez and Renault/Volvo, the Commission divided the sales of
buses into two markets: buses for public transport and touring coaches. Commission
Notice, O.J. C 149/15 (1991) [hereinafter Renault/Heuliez]; Commission Notice, O.J.
C 281/3 (1990) [hereinafter Renault/Volvo]. In Mercedes-Benz/Kassbohrer, it reexam-
ined the issue in the German market and concluded that there were three markets: city
buses, intercity buses, and touring coaches. Commission Decision No. 95/354/EEC,
O.J. L 211/1 (1995) [hereinafter Mercedez-Benz/Kassbohrer].
132. See generally Commission Notice, O.J. C 264/9 (1995) [hereinafter Thomson-
CSF/Teneo/Indra]; Commission Notice, O.J. C 136/4 (1993) [hereinafter Thomson/
Shorts]; Commission Notice, O.J. C 59/13 (1991) [hereinafter Aerospatiale/MBB].
133. See, e.g., Commission Notice, O.J. C 239/4 (1994) [hereinafter Delhaize/PG];
Commission Notice, O.J. C 232/14 (1992) [hereinafter Promodes/BRMC].
134. See Promodes/BRMC, O.J. C 232/14 (1992).
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has noted may change after the January 1995 directive on new
authorization procedures for drugs comes into full effect.' 35
The Commission has repeatedly concluded that while reinsur-
ance is a separate product market, there are as many markets for
life and other forms of insurance "as there are kinds of insur-
ance for different risks." Because of national legislation, estab-
lished market structures, distribution channels, and consumer
preferences, insurance markets remain national even though
Community legislation "increasingly leads to an opening up to
Community-wide competition."1 3 6 The market for reinsurance,
on the other hand, is world-wide. In dealing with a variety of
auto parts sold both to car manufacturers and to consumers for
replacement purposes, original equipment and replacement
markets have consistently been held to be separate, with continu-
ing reliance placed on Michelin, an Article 86 case.1 37 Similarly,
geographic markets for passenger air transport routes have been
defined as city pairs, or bundles of routes where there is evi-
dence of demand-side substitutability, following the decision
made under Article 86 in Ahmed Saeed,13 8 an approach upheld by
the Court of First Instance in Air France v. Commission.' 39 The
market for standard waste handling services is regional or na-
tional, while the market for handling hazardous waste is Com-
munity-wide.14 ° Pay television and free access television are sepa-
rate markets. 141 The list of decided markets, those markets de-
135. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 156/10 (1991) [hereinafter Sanofi/Sterling
Drug] (introducing this approach). It has been followed in a large number of other
cases. E.g., Commission Notice, Oj. C 113/03 (1994) [hereinafter Rhone-Poulenc/
Cooper]; see also Commission Notice, OJ. C 278/04 (1994) [hereinafter American
Home Products (AHP)/American Cyanamid] (noting new drug authorization direc-
tive).
136. Commission Notice, O.J. C 180/03 (1995) [hereinafter Allianz/Elvia/Lloyd
Adriatico]; see generally Commission Notice, O.J. C 296/09 (1991) [hereinafter UAP/
Transadantic/Sun Life]; Commission Notice, O.J. C 299/05 (1994) [hereinafter Com-
mercial Union/Group Victoire].
137. See Commission Decision No. 91/595/EEC, O.J. L 320/26 (1991) (Varta/
Bosch); Commission Notice, O.J. C 265/08 (1991) (Mannesmann/Boge); Pilkington-
Techint/SIV, OJ. L 158/24 (1994).
138. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text (discussing Ahmed Saeed).
139. Air France v. Commission, Case T-2/93, [1994] E.C.R. 11-323.
140. See, e.g., Commission Notice, O.J. C 10/07 (1993) [hereinafter Waste Manage-
ment International plc/SAE]; Commission Notice, Oj. C 88/06 (1993) [hereinafter
SITA-RPC/Scori]; Commission Notice, O.J. C 165/08 (1994) [hereinafter GKN/Bram-
bles/Leto Recycling].
141. See Commission Decision No. 94/922/EC, O.J. L 364/1 (1994), [1995] 1
C.E.C. 2509 [hereinafter MSG Media Service]; Commission Notice, O.J. C 244/06
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fined in the same manner in a series of decisions that rely on
earlier ones, could go on.
The decided markets are important not just because they
are decided but also because the list exposes several common
issues that run through a number of cases in a more general way.
To what extent are markets to be defined for purposes of the
Merger Regulation using the standards applied under Articles 85
and 86? This is not an easy question to answer. The expectation
of a number of commentators that in merger cases the analysis
will be more rigorous, consistent, and economically sound than
under Articles 85 and 86, and that this in turn will influence the
Commission's analysis in the latter, seems to be correct. More
will be said of this subsequently. In one important sense, how-
ever, there is a very clear difference between merger cases and
others. The Merger Regulation is typically applied, as Section 7
of the Clayton Act is in the United States, before the merger or
other concentration has occurred. Article 86 cases rest on proof
of actual market effects of allegedly abusive behavior. The Com-
mission has no such evidence to rely upon in merger cases. It
must predict likely effects at some point in the future, the rele-
vant time itself being a significant issue. At a minimum, this
means the Commission cannot rely on actual price effects as part
of the market definition process or to obviate the need for defin-
ing markets altogether. Moreover, market definition plays a
more significant role in predictive cases than when actual effects
can be seen. It would hardly be surprising to see greater care
used in merger cases.
Because merger cases are predictive, they must deal in some
manner with changes in the market that are in the process of
occurring or that will be occurring in the future, a problem that
typically does not exist in Article 85 and 86 cases where the in-
quiry is more directed to the past and present. If weight is to be
given to future change, how soon must it be likely to occur in
order to be relevant? To be more concrete, what is the impact
on market definition of technological change that has not yet
had a significant market impact but may well do so in the future?
Does, for example, the introduction of digital television trans-
mission impact on the assessment of television markets, even
(1991) [hereinafter ABC/Generale des eaux/Canal+/WH Smith TV]; Commission No-
tice, 0.J. C 129/6 (1995) [hereinafter Kirch/Richemont/Multichoice/Telepiu].
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though it has not yet done so?142 How soon must it be likely to
occur? And should such future change be factored into market
definition, or should it be considered as a separate matter in
assessing the transaction's likely competitive impact? The more
common situation presenting this sort of question arises out of
the EU drive toward a truly common market. Through a long
series of directives and policies the EU has modified, eliminated,
or harmonized previously conflicting national technical and/or
safety standards, licensing and authorization requirements, pro-
curement policies, and a variety of other legal or regulatory re-
quirements. In many instances these harmonizing directives
have just come into effect, or have not been in effect long
enough to accomplish their purpose. Existing national legal and
regulatory regimes have played a significant role in defining
both product and geographic markets. The use of specific tech-
nical standards in public procurement, for example, may impact
upon product substitutability and, therefore, on product market
definition in markets where government procurement plays a
major role. National regulatory policies have played a greater
role, however, in defining geographic markets, so it is here that
the Community's efforts at harmonization have presented the
most serious issues.
It is commonplace that a variety of legal and regulatory bar-
riers can and do have the effect of segregating markets geo-
graphically. Tariffs and quotas have long been seen as preclud-
ing effective competition across national boundaries and, there-
fore, as providing powerful evidence that markets affected by
such barriers are national. Recognition that particular markets
are world-wide has been a phenomenon based on the dropping
of such barriers. National health and safety standards, price reg-
ulation, entry authorization requirements, procurement policies,
and legal protection of government owned or favored enter-
prises can have the same effect. Not surprisingly, national regu-
latory regimes imposing such requirements have played a major
role in the Commission's analysis of geographic markets, often
leading to the conclusion that geographic markets are national
in scope. This is still true today, but the period of time that the
Merger Regulation has been in effect, 1990 to the present, has
coincided with the EU effort to harmonize a broad range of
142. See MSG Media Service, O.J. L 364/1 (1994).
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product standards, authorization and licensing requirements,
public procurement policies, and other regulatory regimes
throughout the entire Common Market. The very purpose of
these efforts is to create truly Community-wide markets where
only national markets existed before. The transition in a broad
range of markets is ongoing but incomplete. For a given prod-
uct or set of products, harmonization directives have not gone
into effect. With others, while the relevant directives have gone
into effect, implementation has not occurred fully. The rate of
implementation may vary from Member State to Member State,
and even where full implementation has occurred, market struc-
ture may not have changed for a wide variety of reasons. The
relevance and evaluation of these changes in defining geo-
graphic markets has posed a difficult problem for the Commis-
sion. Philosophically committed to Community-wide markets,
the Commission cannot and has not simply assumed that such
markets necessarily exist, even though it is reasonable to assume
that for at least some markets, they will exist at some impossible
to predict time in the future. Some markets may, of course, be
national or regional for other reasons, such as transport costs.
The Commission has therefore been required, consciously or
unconsciously, to establish time frames of reference. How far
along must the transition be before it becomes relevant in mar-
ket and/or competitive analysis? If merger cases require a pre-
diction of future effects, at what future time should these effects
be assessed? Put another way, if a given transaction is deemed
anti-competitive over the very short run, should the transaction
be accepted because given the erosion of regulatory barriers the
market will become competitive in the future without competi-
tion policy intervention, with the corollary that the anti-competi-
tive effects will continue to the detriment of consumers until this
occurs? U.S. courts and enforcement authorities have not con-
fronted this set of problems to the same degree. One could ar-
gue that most of these regulatory transition questions were re-
solved in the United States when the Constitution replaced the
Articles of Confederation in 1789, although similar questions
may arise in dealing with mergers in once regulated markets that
are now in the process of deregulation.
The Commission's response to these issues has been cau-
tious. It has not simply assumed that markets that, because of
national regulatory requirements or, some might say, regulatory
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protection, are currently national should be treated as Commu-
nity-wide. To the contrary, it has generally defined markets in
terms of existing structure and practices. Where the presence of
national regulatory regimes has contributed to a determination
that markets are national, it has continued to treat them as na-
tional for market definition purposes even though such regimes
are in the process of harmonization. The pace and effectiveness
of harmonization may be considered in the broader assessment
of likely future effects.
This can be seen in a number of cases. In Alcatel/Telettra,1 43
after a lengthy discussion of Commission directives to liberalize
and deregulate telecommunications markets, as well as its direc-
tive on public procurement, which was to be implemented in
Spain in 1996, the Commission defined the relevant market for
telecommunications equipment as Spain. This definition was
based on the current structural characteristics of the Spanish
market, namely, the procurement policies in Spanish telephone
markets, the lack of need for implementation of the procure-
ment directive until 1996, and the vertical links between the
Spanish telephone monopoly and its major equipment suppliers.
Having so defined the market, the Commission accepted assur-
ances that new procurement policies would be implemented
quickly and the link with its major supplier would be terminated
and accepted the transaction at issue. The Commission's deci-
sion in Mannesmann/Hoesch1" is similar. The market for steel
gas line pipes was defined as national, Germany, in large part
because of the existence of very detailed German product stan-
dards and public procurement policies. After a lengthy discus-
sion of efforts to harmonize standards for these products, efforts
expected to lead to new standards in 1994 and, for some ele-
ments, in 1996, the Commission concluded that until harmoni-
zation was completed the German standards posed a significant
entry barrier and "that an. immediate change cannot be ex-
pected." 45 Even though the market was defined nationally,
however, the transaction was declared compatible with the Com-
mon Market as a result of a competitive assessment resting in
143. Commission Decision No. 91/251/EEC, O.J. L 122/48 (1991), [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 778 [hereinafter Alcatel/Telettra].
144. Commission Decision No. 93/247/EEC, O.J. L 114/34 (1993) [hereinafter
Mannesmann/Hoesch].
145. Id. at 44.
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part on the fact that harmonization of technical standards was to
be completed within two to four years, as was implementation of
the forthcoming Public Procurement Directive. These develop-
ments, characterized by the Commission as "certain," coupled
with the existence of strong entry incentives, indicated that,
while the proposed concentration might immediately create a
dominant position, it would "quickly erode." In Mercedes-Benz/
Kassbohrer146 the Commission's analysis follows the same lines,
finding the market for city buses national because of German
public procurement policies, but then allowing the transaction
to proceed because of the expected changes in those policies.
The cases just discussed might lead to the conclusion that,
while the Commission defines markets in the short-term, it inva-
riably finds ways to allow transactions to proceed where regula-
tory barriers are likely to be removed effectively through Com-
munity-wide harmonization in the foreseeable future, which we
might say means two to four years. At least in cases where the
changes are not clearly predictable and implementation time
seems uncertain, little weight has been given to the fact that har-
monization efforts have begun.
In Alcatel/AEG Kabel,147 the Commission noted that markets
for a variety of cables might be thought to be national because of
a variety of national technical standards, certification proce-
dures, and procurement policies, but that the markets were in a
state of transition because of the harmonization of technical
standards and implementation, or the expected implementa-
tion, of the EC public procurement directive. Because of the
already attained implementation of the procurement directive,
the market for telecommunications cable was characterized as
Community-wide. As to power cables, however, harmonization
was "much less advanced." Because significant differences in na-
tional specifications would likely remain "for the foreseeable fu-
ture," the power cable market was defined as national. In
Hoechst/Schering,148 while no final decision on geographic mar-
kets was made, the Commission's notification strongly suggests
that, in part because of widely divergent authorization proce-
dures, herbicide and fungicide markets should be characterized
146. Mercedes-Benz/Kassbohrer, 0J. L 211/1, at 19-20, 100 (1995).
147. Commission Notice, 0J. C 6/23 (1992) [hereinafter Alcatel/AEG Kabel].
148. Commission Notice, OJ. C 9/03 (1994) [hereinafter Hoechst/Schering].
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as national despite a 1991 directive meant to harmonize authori-
zation procedures. Because of the long time needed to evaluate
these materials, no time frame for the full effect of the directive
could be established. It should be noted, however, that Alcatel!
AEG Kabel, Hoechst/Schering, and a number of like cases, 14 9 were
notifications issued without full proceedings. in each of these
cases, the Commission concluded, after a conventional market
analysis, that the concentration did not raise serious doubts
about compatibility with the Common Market. It was not re-
quired to go further and consider the weight to be given to har-
monization directives in its competitive assessment.
These transition issues will become less severe as the harmo-
nization of regulatory standards becomes increasingly effective.
National markets will become Community markets, and we may
expect that geographic market issues will focus more on whether
markets are local or regional within Europe on the one hand, or
world-wide on the other. Past decisions defining markets nation-
ally because of different regulatory standards may be cast aside.
The pharmaceutical cases provide some foreshadowing of things
to come. In its 1991 notification in Sanofi/Sterling Drug,150 the
Commission concluded that pharmaceutical markets were na-
tional. By 1995 the Commission was taking note of the entry
into force on January 1 of that year of the new marketing author-
ization procedures for drugs throughout the Community. Be-
cause various national regulatory requirements are not affected
by the adoption of these procedures, drug markets were still
characterized as national,' but these are markets where a
broader geographic market will in the not-too-distant future be
found.
The Commission's approach to the transitional problems
arising from the harmonization over time of a variety of national
regulatory requirements and procurement policies has been
highly pragmatic. When truly pushed, in cases where concentra-
tions might otherwise be found incompatible with the Common
Market because of such existing requirements, it has tended to
149. See, e.g., Commission Notice, O.J. C 322/19 (1991) [hereinafter TNT/Canada
Post].
150. Commission Notice, OJ. C 156/10 (1991) [hereinafter Sanofi/Sterling
Drug].
151. See American Home Products (AHP)/American Cyanamid, OJ. C 278/3
(1994).
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allow the parties to proceed where harmonization is very likely,
over a relatively short time period, to ameliorate their impacts,
although it has done so not in the way it defines markets but in
its overall analysis of competitive effects. By so doing, it is implic-
itly recognized that at least some of the concentrations notified
to it reflect the desire of the parties to position themselves to be
competitive as protecting barriers fall. It would be ironic if par-
ties were driven to merge in anticipation of impending harmoni-
zation, and the Commission's analysis in the meantime ignored
that fact.
One further transitional issue is now developing. On Janu-
ary 1, 1993, the European Economic Area ("EEA") Treaty came
into effect. As a result, and with little discussion, Commission
notifications in some cases began to characterize markets not as
Community-wide but as EEA-, or Community and EEA, wide."3 2
The Europe Agreements may ultimately have similar effects,
either because the countries of Eastern Europe become full-
fledged EC members, or because of the dropping of trade barri-
ers even if they do not. These changes will likely force the Com-
mission to a greater consideration of intra-European regional
markets for some products and services.
Finally, before turning to a more detailed analysis of the EC
approach to both product and geographic market definitions
under the Merger Regulation, one other element common to
the analysis of both should be noted. Any reader of the Commis-
sion's modifications and decisions must be struck by the fre-
quency with which the Commission relies on surveys and other
inquiries of both competitors and customers and, in some cases,
consumers, in the affected markets. The Justice Department
and Federal Trade Commission have done the same. The
Merger Guidelines, which define markets by asking what would
happen in response to a "small but significant and non-transitory
152. See, e.g., Commission Notice, O.J. C 212/23 (1992) [hereinafter Rhone
Poulenc/SNIA]. In deciding whether EFTA countries are included in the market, the
focus has been on the presence or absence of legal or regulatory barriers, transport
costs and the degree of existing import and exports between EU member states and
EFTA countries. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 94/208/EC, O.J. L 102/15 (1994),
[1994] 1 C.E.C. 2136 [hereinafter Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva]; Commission Notice,
O.J. C 259/03 (1994) [hereinafter Vesuvius/Wulfrath]. See also Commission Notice,
OJ. C 187/07, 16 (1994) [hereinafter Electrolux/AEG] ("The integration of EU and
EFTA States and the resulting removal of barriers to trade means that markets are no
longer national in scope.").
EC COMPETITION LAW
price increase," virtually invite the use of data derived from com-
petitors and customers. The same question is posed in a
number of Commission decisions. Such inquiries produce a
good deal of information. The Commission, however, also relies
on the ultimate judgments of consumers and competitors with
respect to product substitutes, consumer preferences, and geo-
graphic availability of competing products, particularly when
they agree on these questions. It is thus not unusual for Com-
mission decisions and notifications to recite the judgments of
customers and competitors as one ground for defining markets
in a particular manner. 53 There is little evidence that this has
been done routinely in Article 85 and 86 cases.
A. The Definition of Product Markets Under the Merger Regulation
The Merger Regulation itself contains no specific provisions
dealing with how product markets are to be defined, nor does it
indicate how market share data is to be used or weighted in the
Commission's competitive analysis. Its ultimate standard, that a
merger that "creates or strengthens a dominant position as a re-
sult of which effective competition would be significantly im-
peded in the common market or in a substantial part of it..." is
prohibited, suggests an analysis comparable to that for finding
dominance under Article 86. This calls for the use of market
shares at least as a starting point in merger cases. The Court of
First Instance has so indicated. 54 A critical element of market
share determination is product market definition, the point at
which the competitive analysis in the Commission's notifications
and decisions routinely begins. Definition of product markets is
also critical in considerations relating to relief and to the evalua-
tion of undertakings offered by the parties in order to be permit-
ted to. proceed with concentrations otherwise thought by the
Commission to be incompatible with the Common Market.
Very broadly, the Commission has defined product markets
in terms of substitutability in the eyes of the consumer, demand
substitutability, and, in a much more limited number of cases, in
153. See generally Commission Notice, O.J. C 300/22 (1991) [hereinafter
Metallgesellschaft/Safic Alcan]; Commission Decision No. 91/535/EEC, O.J. L 290/35
(1991), [1992] 4 C.M.L.R. M81 [hereinafter Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval]; Commission Deci-
sion No. 92/553/EEC, O.J. L 356/1 (1992) [hereinafter Nesle/Perrier]; Commission
Notice, O.J. C 169/10 (1994) [hereinafter Medeol SA/Elosua SA].
154. Air France, [1994] E.C.R. at 11-352, 80.
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terms of supply substitutability. Market definition is an empiri-
cal economic issue, an issue addressed in the Merger Guidelines
by asking what would happen if a hypothetical monopolist of a
given product, narrowly defined, imposed a "small but signifi-
cant and non-transitory price increase, the price of other prod-
ucts remaining the same." '155 This same formulation appears in
various forms in several Commission decisions, most notably Nes-
tle/Perier,15 6 where the Commission concluded that "an appreci-
able non-transitory increase in the price of source waters" would
not lead to a significant shift to soft drinks. More often, the
Commission has begun its analysis with the "price, characteris-
tics, and intended use" formula found in several notices and
block exemptions issued in the implementation of Article
85(3) .157
In many cases, product markets are uncontested and obvi-
ous. The issue of product market definition arises when there
are arguably other products to which consumers could turn in
the event the concentration attempted to increase price or en-
gage in other conduct that adversely affects their interest, or
where a generic class of products, for example "beverages,"
which in a very general sense serve the same purpose for con-
sumers, such as quenching thirst, but the market needs more
narrow definition to accurately reflect a reasonable degree of
substitutability. There may be a number of products that meet a
given consumer need, but consumers do not treat all of them
indifferently. Some end users of a given product may, because
of their specific needs or end uses, have virtually no real substi-
tutes available, while others, purchasing exactly the same prod-
uct, may be readily able to turn to substitutes.
There are a variety of methods by which demand sub-
stitutability could be measured. Consumers simply could be
asked to identify substitutes, or to respond directly in an effort to
elicit their response to a hypothetical price increase. Direct in-
quiry of competitors may reveal the substitute products that they
perceive to be a competitive threat, and/or to identify industry
practice that is of evidentiary value. Cross-elasticity studies re-
155. 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 1.11.
156. Nesfle/Perrier, O.J. L 356/1, at 3-4 (1992).
157. E.g., Commission Notice, O.J. C 56/16 (1991) [hereinafter Digital/Kienzle];
Mannesmann/Hoesch, O.J. L 114/34, at 38, 40 (1993).
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flecting price relationships between products can be utilized.
The characteristics of the products at issue, including their phys-
ical attributes, design, and normal uses, may be evaluated,,to the
end of identifying what a reasonable consumer could do. The
Commission has utilized all of these techniques, often in combi-
nation, in the product market definition process. Because all of
these elements are so commonly used in combination, it is diffi-
cult to know what weight the Commission gives to each. The
decided cases can, however, be broken into specific categories
and each of the critical factors examined independently. First,
there are a large number of cases in which the critical issue is
whether products that are not the same in terms of physical
characteristics, but are used for the same purpose by consumers,
are in the same market. For example, are paper towels and pa-
per napkins in the same market? Second, where products are
physically similar, but are used for different purposes by buyers,
markets might be identified by end use. Third, within a given
product market, producers may use some percentage of their
product output internally, as when aluminum ingot is both sold
to manufacturers of fabricated aluminum products and used in-
ternally by the ingot producers to produce products from it. Is
such captive use part of the product market? These same ques-
tions also have been considered, of course, under Article 86.
1. Physically or Technically Differentiated Products
Like Article 86 cases, the Commission's merger analysis in
the first category of cases typically begins with an examination of
qualitative factors, the physical characteristics, and the end uses
of the products in question. Where these characteristics or uses
are sufficiently different, they may belong in separate markets
for that reason alone. In Fiat Geotech/Ford New Holland,158 for ex-
ample, the Commission divided the agriculture machinery mar-
ket into tractors, combines, and hay and forage machines based
on little more than its assessment that each type of machine was
physically different and served different consumer needs. This is
an objective evaluation, arrived at without consideration of cross-
elasticity or reliance on surveys of consumers or competitors.
There are a number of cases of this sort, some of them directly
158. Commission Notice, OJ. C 118/14 (1991) [hereinafter Fiat Geotech/Ford
New Holland].
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applying the standard in the Notice on Agreements of Minor Im-
portance, namely that product interchangeability should be
'judged from the vantage point of the user, normally taking the
characteristics, price, and intended use of the good together
"9159
The qualitative inquiry focuses initially on physical charac-
teristics, technological considerations, and the uses to which the
product has been and can be put. In ABC/Generale des Eaux/Ca-
nal+/WH.Smith TV,16 0 for example, the Commission concluded
that pay-television was a market apart from free-access television.
Pay-television, financed by subscription fees, broadcast special-
ized programming catering to narrowly targeted audiences.
While free-access television, on the other hand, paid for by ad-
vertising revenues, offered programming of wider interest. This
distinction is adhered to and elaborated upon in a subsequent
series of cases.1 6 1 In DuPont/ICI,16 2 the market for nylon carpet
fibers was distinguished from polypropylene, acrylic, polyester,
and natural fibers after a very detailed analysis of such character-
istics as dyeability, resilience, abrasion resistance, and flammabil-
ity, all characteristics of importance to carpet manufacturers. In
pharmaceutical cases, different technical and therapeutic quali-
ties have led the Commission to define markets in accordance
with the third level of the ATC system recognized by the WHO, a
delineation recognized by the Commission as involving "a cer-
tain level of arbitrariness," indicating that, within a limited
range, considerations of certainty and administrative ease may
be appropriate. 63 Steel gas line pipes were distinguished from
pipes of plastic and other materials in Mannesmann/Hoesch64 not
159. Notice on Agreements, 0.J. C 231/2, § 11 (1986); see supra note 156 (citing
cases that use this standard). While the Merger Regulation itself says nothing about
product market definition, as already noted, Form CO, which sets forth what is re-
quired in a notification, incorporates this same "characteristics, price, and intended
use" standard. Form correlating to the notification of a concentration pursuant to reg-
ulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 §6,1, reprinted in EEC Merger Control Reporter (Kluwer
1996, Part A, p. 31).
160. ABC/Generale des eaux/Canal+/WH Smith TV, OJ. C 244/06 (1991).
161. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing cases distinguishing be-
tween pay-television and free-access television).
162. Commission Decision No. 93/9/EEC, O.J. L 7/13 (1992) [hereinafter Du
Pont/ICI].
163. Sanofi/Sterling Drug, O.J. C 156/10 (1991); see supra note 134 and accompa-
nying text (discussing other pharmaceutical cases).
164. Mannesmann/Hoesch, OJ. L 114/34, at 39, 42 (1993).
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only because of significantly different physical characteristics,
but also because of barriers to interchangeability based upon dif-
ferences in national safety standards and procurement policies.
In these and a number of other cases, market definition rested
on the Commission's qualitative assessment without detailed
consideration of cross-elasticity studies or of more subjective fac-
tors, such as consumer or competitor opinion.
The evaluation of a product's characteristics and end uses
is., as noted above, to be examined "from the vantage point of
the user." The Commission, therefore, may focus on the nature
and needs of consumers themselves. While products may seem
fungible in terms of purpose, switching costs may preclude more
than limited substitutability, as was the case in Tractabel/Distrigaz
11,165 where gas and electricity were viewed as separate markets.
Based largely on what it perceived as different needs of business
and leisure travelers, the Commission in Havas Voyage/American
Express166 regarded travel agencies serving business travelers as a
market different from those serving those leisure travelers. In
Medeol/Elosua167 bottled olive oil was distinguished from bottled
sunflower oil partly because the two products appealed to differ-
ent groups of consumers. Olive oil generally was purchased by
those who like its taste and its health benefits, while sunflower
oil appealed to those with different tastes and attracted to its
sharply lower prices. In perhaps its most extreme use of con-
sumer profiling, the Commission in Newspaper Publishing168 rec-
ognized that there were separate markets for British tabloid,
mid-market, and quality newspapers, based upon differences in
price, content, and the different socio-economic levels of their
readers.
Reliance on qualitative characteristics of this sort in product
market definition is commonplace in American cases as well,
where a similar analysis is typically the starting point, and, in
some cases, the end of the inquiry. This is not true of all of the
qualitative factors upon which some of the Commission's deci-
sions rely, particularly where the use of different absolute price
levels, as opposed to a lack of correlation in price movements, is
165. Commission Notice, O.J. C 249/3 (1994) [hereinafter Tractebel/Distrigaz
II].
166. Havas Voyages/American Express, O.J. C 117/8 (1995).
167. Medeol SA/Eiosua SA, O.J. C 169/10 (1994).
168. Commission Notice, o.J. C 85/6 (1994) [hereinafter Newspaper Publishing].
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used to differentiate product markets. In Torras/Sarrio,169 for ex-
ample, one factor relied upon in putting coated and uncoated
paper in different markets was that coated paper prices were
roughly fifteen percent higher. Differences in prices were one
of several factors used in VIAG/Continental Can 170 to separate
glass, plastic, and metal beverage containers. Substantial price
differences contributed to the conclusions in Nestle/Perrier171 that
bottled source waters and soft drinks were not in the same mar-
ket and in Newspaper Publishing'72 that the British market for na-
tional newspapers consisted of separate markets for tabloid, mid-
market, and quality papers.1 73 In each of these cases, the Com-
mission's decision did not rest solely on price level differences,
and is, perhaps, justifiable on other grounds.
Reliance on price differences in product market definition
is a characteristic of EC competition policy generally, as we have
seen. Why are such differences, unconnected from relative price
movements, relevant at all? As the leading American commenta-
tor notes, and as the U.S. Supreme Court held in the DuPont
case,' 74 "[p]roducts can be near-perfect substitutes even when
their prices or qualities differ."175 Consumers could switch from
a product priced at US$1.00 to a substitute priced at US$1.50 if
the lower-priced product increased to US$1.10 and the con-
sumer used the cheaper product only when the price differential
was US$0.50. While the relativity of price movements is of great
169. Commission Notice, O.J. C 58/20 (1992) [hereinafter Torras/Sarrio].
170. Commission Notice, O.J. C 156/10 (1991) [hereinafter VIAG/Continental
Can]; see also Commission Decision No. 96/222/EC, O.J. L 75/38 (1996) [hereinafter
Crown Cork & Seal/Carnaud Metalbox] (concluding that there is no single packaging
market that includes metal, glass, plastic, and paper). The Commission found that tin-
plate and aluminum aerosol spray cans are in separate markets because of a lack of
elasticity between aluminum and tinplate cans. The Commission based its finding on a
combination of price and quality differences, an analysis of customer switching costs,
and customer surveys.
171. Nestle/Perrier, O.J. L 356/1 (1992).
172. Newspaper Publishing, O.J. C 85/6 (1994).
173. See Medeol/Elosua, OJ. C 169/10 (1994) (relying in part on large price dif-
ferences in putting olive oil and sunflower oil in different markets); see also Commission
Notice, O.J. C 225/3 (1994) [hereinafter Voith/Sulzer (II)] (suggesting that large price
differences between new and reconstructed paper machines indicated that they were in
separate markets).
174. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane) 351 U.S. 377
(1956).
175. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 2, at 562c.
EC COMPETITION LAW
importance, absolute price levels seem in most cases of little rele-
vance.
In some cases involving manufacturers of goods incorpo-
rated into final products by downstream manufacturers, the
Commission has relied on another price factor, the relationship
of the price of the upstream product to the price of the finished
product, in segregating markets. This is illustrated in WAG/Con-
tinental Can,1 76 where the Commission observed that beverage
containers were but a small part of the retail cost of beverages,
and in Tetra-Pak/Alfa Laval,171 where machines for packaging
aseptic milk in cartons were defined to exclude machines for
packaging such milk in plastic and glass, with the Commission
noting that the machines were but a small part of the retail price
of aseptic milk. Because this was so, the Commission reasoned,
the retailer's decision to purchase milk likely would not be influ-
enced by a significant price increase in the price of packaging
machines. Why, one might ask, is the focus not on the decisions
made by beverage and milk bottlers who purchase these ma-
chines? The same rationale might apply, but if retailers, and
consumers, are indifferent to the packaging, why would bottlers
not switch in response to a significant machine price increase?
The answer in these cases may well be that they are not indiffer-
ent.17
8
While a number of Commission decisions end with its quali-
tative analysis, many, particularly those where a full proceeding
was initiated, do not. A simple characteristics, price, and end
use analysis is often inconclusive. Physically different products
may serve the same function for at least some buyers, or at least
so it is argued. While the Commission has repeatedly asserted
that "a limited substitutability in terms of functionality is not suf-
ficient to establish substitutability in competition terms,"179 the
evaluation of the degree of substitutability in these cases is typi-
cally more complex than an examination of qualitative factors
permits. Care must be taken here not to place too much weight
176. VIAG/Continental Can, OJ. C 156/10.(1991).
177. Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval, O.J. L 290/35, at 38, 1 19 (1991), [1992] 4 C.M.L.R.
M81, M88 (following decision under Article 86 in Tetra Pak II).
178. The decision in Tetra Pak II found that consumers had strong packaging pref-
erences and that those preferences exerted a greater influence over packager/produ-
cers than price.
179. Nestle/Perrier, OJ. L 356/1, at 2 (1992).
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on notifications where the Commission simply assumes the most
narrow market without decision after suggesting a range of very
narrow markets, almost casually at times. In the typical case
where there is a significant issue concerning differentiated prod-
ucts and where the matter cannot be disposed of by simply as-
suming the most narrow possible market, the Commission has
relied heavily on quantitative methods of analysis, such as rela-
tive price movements, more formal econometric cross-elasticity
studies, and, in some cases, on more subjective evaluations by
competitors and consumers.
Cross-elasticity of demand is a conventional method of mar-
ket analysis. 180 Measures of cross-elasticity, the rate at which buy-
ers switch to a substitute product in response to a price increase
in another, are an alternative means of analyzing interchangea-
bility, a methodology utilized by the U.S. Supreme Court in
United States v. E.E. du Pont de Nemours & Co.18' and in the
Merger Guidelines. The Commission's use of cross-elasticity
studies and relative price movements generally looks to existing
prices, and thus is subject to the so-called Cellophane fallacy,
namely that buyers may switch from product A to product B
when the price of A rises only when the manufacturer of A is
already charging monopoly prices. 18 2 The 1992 Merger Guide-
lines attempt to correct this problem to some extent, 8 3 but the
Commission has not done so. The use of current prices for
cross-elasticity analysis may, however, be perfectly justifiable
where, as under the Merger Regulation, the focus is on future
competitive conditions.18 4 Consumer and competitor surveys
may also be of value, if for no other reason than that people who
deal in a given product may know better than anyone else the
markets in which they function. Competitor responses, of
course, must take into account that competitors may color their
views based on their views of the competitive or efficiency effects
of the merger in question.
180. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at § 3.4.
181. 351 U.S. at 377.
182. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 2, at 539.
183. "[T]he Agency will use prevailing prices.., unless premerger circumstances
are strongly suggestive of coordinated interaction, in which case the Agency will use a
price more reflective of the competitive price." 1992 MERCER GUDELNES, supra note
18, § 1.11.
184. William F. Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's View, 71 CAL. L.
REv. 618, 623 n.35 (1983).
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Cross-elasticity, or the lack thereof, has played a major role
in a number of cases.1 8 5 In Tetra Pak/Alfa-LavaP86 the Commis-
sion faced the argument that machines for packaging aseptic
milk in cartons were in the same markets as machines packaging
the same product in plastic or glass. After finding different phys-
ical characteristics between the two types of packaging that im-
pacted on retailer and transport costs, the Commission also re-
lied on the views of both manufacturers and dairies that price
elasticity was low. The Commission's decision in Nestle/Perrier,1 ay
finding that bottled source water and soft drinks were not a sin-
gle market and defining the market as bottled source water
alone, is a particularly good example of the Commission's
method of analysis where some degree of substitutability is likely.
First, the Commission examined the physical characteristics of
bottled source water, finding that consumers identified it with
purity, cleanliness, and "in general, health and a healthy style of
life," a view confirmed by a number of consumer surveys and by
the manner in which the product is promoted. Second, to fur-
ther emphasize these differences, the Commission found sub-
stantial absolute price differences, with soft drinks selling at two
to three times the price of bottled source water, a factor of dubi-
ous relevance, as discussed earlier, although given the magni-
tude of the price difference it may be more relevant here than in
other cases. Finally, the Commission found that the prices for
the two sets of products had had a very different price evolution
and that there was an absence of any real price correlation. Sim-
ilarly, in DuPont/ICP3' the Commission's differentiation between
nylon and polypropylene fibers began with an assessment of the
physical and use characteristics of each fiber type. Its conclusion
that nylon fibers were in a separate market were confirmed by a
lack of cross-price elasticity. Even though the Commission
found that it was unable to measure precisely, the data was suffi-
cient to show a general tendency.
By far the most elaborate analysis of product markets is the
185. See, e.g., Newspaper Publishing, O.J. C 85/6 (1994); Medeol SA/Elosua SA,
O.J. C 169/10 (1994).
186. Tetra Pak/Alfa-Laval, OJ. L 290/35 (1991).
187. Nestle/Perrier, 0J. L 356/1 (1992).
188. Du Pont/ICI, 0.J. L 7/13 (1992).
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Commission's decision in Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz,18 9
where the critical issue was whether there was a single product
market for feminine hygiene products or whether tampons and
sanitary pads were in two separate markets. While both are used
for the same general purpose, there are significant physical dif-
ferences between them. As in Nestle/Perrier, the Commission ex-
amined consumer preferences, finding, on the basis of a series
of consumer studies, that once a decision was made to use one
product or the other, the usage patterns remained stable,
although Procter & Gamble introduced conflicting studies.
Studies of supermarket scanner data indicated that cross-price
elasticity was low. Tampons and sanitary pads, therefore, were
separate product markets. It is hard to imagine what the Com-
mission omitted.
Other forms of consumer and customer inquiries also have
been used. These inquiries may simply gather relevant facts,
seek to identify likely responses to hypothetical price increases,
or ask forjudgments about market definition directly. In Aeros-
patiale-Alenia/De Havilland,1 90 for example, the Commission dis-
tinguished between commuter aircraft with twenty to thirty-nine
seats, forty to fifty-nine seats, and sixty seats and over, based in
large part on the views of competitors and customers that these
divisions did reflect accurately relevant markets. Other cases 9 '
place similar reliance on such judgments, both as to product and
geographic markets. There are clearly dangers in the reliance
not on the facts, but on the opinions such inquiries elicit. It
would be extremely unwise to rely simply on such opinions,
which may reflect a number of biases, and the Commission has
not done so. In each instance where such opinions have been
referred to, they have been confirmed by qualitative evidence.
2. Physically Similar Products with Different End Uses or
Methods of Distribution
Products that appear identical or nearly identical may be
sold for quite different end uses. A chemical agent, Agent X,
might be sold for use as a component in drug manufacture or in
189. Commission Decision No. 94/893/EC, O.J. L 354/32 (1994), [1995] 1 C.E.C.
2466 [hereinafter Proctor & Gamble/VP Schickedanz].
190. Commission Decision No. 91/619/EEC, O.J. L 334/42 (1991) [hereinafter
Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland].
191. See, e.g., Medeol/Elosua, O.J. C 169/10 (1994).
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the manufacture of paint. When, if ever, should the market be
defined in terms of end use, for example, as the sale of Agent X
to drug manufacturers? Or when should the market definition
of an otherwise fungible product take into account the type of
distributor to whom it is sold? Under the Merger Guidelines,
end use markets are appropriate only if the seller could success-
fully impose a "small but significant and non-transitory price in-
crease" on a particular group of buyers, that is, when it can suc-
cessfully discriminate in price.'92 The answer under the Merger
Regulation is less clear.
The Commission has suggested end use or class of customer
markets in notifications in which it has not decided on market
definition but has simply assumed the narrowest possible mar-
ket.1 9 These cases are not a reliable guide to the Commission's
thinking. There are cases, such as DuPont/ICI, where markets
are defined in end use terms. In DuPont/ICI, for example, nylon
fibers for use in carpet manufacture, but in DuPont/ICI the fibers
for different uses differed physically. A carpet manufacturer,
therefore, could not buy from or resell to a different type of
manufacturer who used nylon fiber with different physical char-
acteristics. But what of the case where the same product is sold
to different types of buyers?
Since the Court of Justice's decision in Michelin,194 an Arti-
cle 86 case treating the sales of new tires to OEMs and to distrib-
utors for sale as new replacement tires as separate markets, the
Commission has maintained the distinction in a number of cases
involving automobile parts. The Commission has maintained
the distinction even though the parts sold to OEMs and as
replacements are exactly the same. The distinction appears in a
number of decisions under the Merger Regulation.195 As a prac-
tical matter, given the decision in Michelin, upon which a
number of merger decisions expressly rely, the Commission may
have no choice. It has not questioned whether the standards
adopted in an Article 86 case should apply to merger cases, and
192. 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 1.12.
193. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc/Cooper, O.J. C 113/03 (1994) (leaving open ques-
tions whether distribution of drugs by wholesalers and direct sales by laboratories are
separate markets).
194. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing Michelin).
195. See Varta/Bosch, Oj. L 320/26 (1991); Mannesmann/Boge, O.J. C 265/08
(1991); Pilkington-Techint/SIV, Oj. L 158/24 (1993).
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it has explained the outcome in the same terms as Michelin. It
has stressed that the distinction reflects common industry prac-
tice, as well as different competitive conditions. Sales to car
manufacturers require that they strictly comply with specifica-
tions of the buyer, maintain a close research relationship be-
tween buyer and seller, and satisfy year-round just-in-time deliv-
ery requirements. These relationships are not needed in the re-
placement market, where there are sales to a large number of
varied types of buyers, demand is seasonal, and an extended dis-
tribution system is required.196 The Commission, however, has
not discussed the price relationship between these two markets,
nor has it asked whether these equipment manufacturers can, or
have, successfully discriminated in price between these two
classes of buyers. If one assumes that car manufacturers pay a
lower price for equipment on new cars than is paid for replace-
ment parts, how is this discrimination maintained? The answer
may simply be that of a lawyer rather than an economist. The
Commission is simply following what the Court of Justice has
said.
On the other hand, when the Commission in McCormick/
CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann'97 concluded that the sale of dried herbs
and spices to food retailers was a market separate from sales to
industrial users and restaurants, it rested its decision squarely on
the fact that retailers may be charged different prices, and that
arbitrage between these groups of customers did not seem possi-
ble. Retailers buy in small glass bottles, whereas industrial users
buy in large drums. Repackaging did not seem likely.
Thus, while the Commission has occasionally suggested end
use markets, particularly where different distribution systems are
involved, there is nothing in its Merger Regulation cases to sug-
gest that, in the absence of price discrimination, it is prepared to
define markets in end use terms where products are otherwise
found to be interchangeable.1
98
196. See Varta/Bosch, OJ. L 320/26 (1991) (explaining why relationships are not
needed in replacement market); see also Mannesmann/Boge, OJ. C 265/08 (1991).
197. Commission Notice, O.J. C 256/03 (1993) [hereinafter McCormick/CPC/
Rabobank/Ostmann].
198. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 204/09 (1991) (suggesting separate markets
for granulated sugar to industrial users and to retail trade) [hereinafter Eridiana/ISI].
The Commission did not ultimately reach a decision, referring instead to each class of
sales as market "segments." It noted that there was a close price connection between
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3. Supply Substitutability
The ability of a firm or group of firms to increase price
above competitive levels is dependent not only on demand fac-
tors but also on the willingness of firms not currently producing
the product to do so in response. Potential competition may
check market power as effectively as the availability of substitute
products. Issues relating to market barriers and long run poten-
tial entry are generally outside the scope of this Article. Supply
substitutability may bear, however, on market definition and to
that extent is relevant here.
Supply substitutability can be considered in two ways in
terms of market definition. Markets can be defined simply in
terms of demand considerations, and all questions relating to
potential entry can be assessed as part of the general analysis of
competitive effects, the method generally employed by U.S. en-
forcement agencies and courts through the 1970s.1 99
Alternatively, at least in those cases where firms not produc-
ing the product currently have the ability to do so without incur-
ring substantial costs within a relatively short period of time, the
market can be defined as including some part of the capacity of
these firms, with longer run potential entry still separately evalu-
ated in the competitive analysis. The latter is now the approach
taken in the Merger Guidelines. 0 Specifically, these Merger
Guidelines include in the market those firms likely to produce
the product in question within one year in response to a signifi-
cant price increase, where there are no significant sunk entry
and exit costs, and no serious product acceptance, production,
or distribution barriers that would make entry unprofitable. The
obvious case is where a firm outside the market currently has the
technology and equipment to produce the product in question
and the ability, through its existing system, o distribute it. Once
firms meet the Merger Guidelines' criteria, the amount of their
capacity likely to be devoted to production in response to a sig-
nificant price increase is included in the calculation of market
share.
the two segments, but that this was unlikely to be a factor in the absence of price varia-
tions.
199. See United States v. Waste Management, Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984)
(explaining difference between old regime, where supply substitutability was treated
apart from market definition, and new regime of Merger Guidelines).
200. 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 1.32.
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Despite the fact that the Commission's decision in Continen-
tal Can,21 an Article 86 case, was rejected by the Court ofJustice
in part because of its failure to assess adequately supply-side sub-
stitutability in defining the relevant market, markets have gener-
ally been defined only in terms of demand substitutability. All
matters relating to future entry, whether in the short- or long-
term, have been considered in evaluating dominance and anti-
competitive effects. This has been true in Articles 85 and 86
cases, in those block exemptions where a calculation of market
share may be required, and in the Notice, where substitutability
is determined in terms of characteristics, price, and intended
use. The same has been true in decisions under the Merger Reg-
ulation. Potential competition is generally evaluated in deter-
mining dominance, although it must be said that seldom has a
concentration been allowed where in the short run it results in
dominance because of the likelihood of entry in the more dis-
tant future.20 2
It would not be accurate to say, however, that supply sub-
stitutability has never been relevant in product market defini-
tion. In Aerospatiale-Alena/De Havilland,20 3 the Commission did
consider the ability of aircraft manufacturers producing com-
muter aircraft in the twenty to thirty-nine seat aircraft category
to produce commuter aircraft in the forty to fifty-nine seat cate-
gory, and vice versa, as part of its process of defining relevant
product markets. It concluded that, while there might be some
possibility that manufacturers could modify existing models to
larger capacities, the ability was insufficient to show that aircraft
in one group were substitutable for aircraft in another, which
appears to be a strict demand substitutability test. It also noted,
however, that even if facilities for doing so already existed, con-
version of production would take "longer than three or four
years, '"204 which the Commission obviously believed was too long.
In Mannesmann/Hoesch20 5 possible supply substitutability was
considered in greater detail. After concluding in demand terms
that the market appeared to be steel gas-line pipes, it turned to
the argument that the market should not be so defined because
201. Continental Can, [1973] E.C.R. 215, [1973] C.M.L.R. 199.
202. But see Mercedes-Benz/Kassbohrer, O.J. L 211/1 (1995).
203. Aerospatiale-Alenia/De Havilland, OJ. L 334/42 (1991).
204. Id. at 45, 14.
205. Mannesmann/Hoesch, O.J. L 114/34 (1993).
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producers of other types of steel tubes could quickly and easily
switch production to gas-line pipe. The Commission established
a general standard that in determining product markets "supply-
side substitutability can only be taken into account if manufac-
turers of products other than the product in question can read-
ily and quickly switch to the production of the latter."2 6 The
Commission then rejected this argument, partly because it con-
cluded that switching would be more costly and time-consuming
than the parties contended. To the extent the argument rested
on the ability of manufacturers of other types of steel tubes to
switch, as opposed to the ability of firms that did not already
produce steel tubes to do so, given that all major steel cable
manufacturers already produced gas line pipe, the question was
not one of market definition but of potential capacity utilization
by firms already in the market. The issue, in short, was one of
expansion, not entry. Nevertheless, the decision clearly suggests
that supply substitutability may be relevant to market definition
in a limited number of cases.
This is confirmed in McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann,2 0 7
where the Commission had concluded, based on demand con-
siderations, that sales of herbs and spices to retailers were a mar-
ket separate from the sale of these products to industrial and
catering firms. The Commission factually rejected a contention
that firms specializing in sales to the latter could switch to sup-
plying retailers and should therefore be included in the retail
market. Supply-side substitution was relevant in market defini-
tions only "when it can take place in the very short-term and
without significant costs." 2°8 The Commission found there
would be significant costs and time lags.
Because these decisions factually reject supply substitution
claims, they are not clear demonstrations of the Commission's
willingness to modify markets defined in demand terms as a re-
sult of supply considerations. The language of these decisions
does suggest the possibility. The standard in McCormick/CPC/
Rabobank/Ostmann begins to sound like the standard in the
Merger Guidelines.
206. Id. at 41, 66.
207. McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann, O.J. C 256/03 (1993).
208. Id.
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4. Other Product Market Issues
a. Technology Markets
The licensing of technology is a significant business activity
with major consequences throughout the world. It is not surpris-
ing that antitrust authorities in the United States and the Euro-
pean Community have begun to focus directly on the impact of
private firm conduct on technological development, and to do
so by focusing directly on competitive effects as measured in
technology terms, rather than on the impact of such conduct in
the product or service markets in which technology is utilized, as
has been done in the past. This shift of focus will in some cases
require definition of technology markets. In recent years, the
Justice Department has in several cases defined markets in terms
of technology development and licensing.2" 9 The Commission
did so for the first time in Shell/Montecatini,21 where one of the
markets in which the competitive effects of a proposed joint ven-
ture was defined as the licensing of advanced polypropylene
technology and associated services, a market that the Commis-
sion concluded was world-wide in scope. This decision was fol-
lowed in Union Carbide/Enichem,2 1  which dealt with the licensing
of polyethylene technology.
The use of technology markets in competitive analysis raises
a number of issues not discussed here. It may be noted, how-
ever, that the Commission's approach to market definition in
these cases is relatively conventional. In both, the analysis began
with recognition of product markets for polypropylene and poly-
ethylene. The available and desired technologies in the produc-
tion of these products were identified, as were the firms engaged
in licensing these relevant technologies. Market shares were
then determined.
The identification of competing technologies is a daunting
task, more complex in many cases than in the cases that the
209. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp. and ZF Friedrichshafen A.G.,
Civ. No. 93-530 (D.Dela. 1993) (complaint-transaction withdrawn); United States v.
Pilkington plc, 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,842 (D.Ariz.) (consent). The FIC has
also used such market definitions. See, e.g., Montedison S.p.A., 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 73,749 (1995) (consent).
210. Commission Decision No. 94/811/EC, O.J. L 332/48 (1994) [hereinafter
Shell/Montecatini]. See Lowe, supra note 127, at 142-43 (discussing Shell/Monteca-
tini).
211. Union Carbide/Enichem, O.J. C 123/05 (1995).
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Commission has considered so far. Much further development
is needed before the Commission's approach can be fully evalu-
ated.
b. Captive Output
It is standard practice in the United States that captive out-
put, output of a factor of production used internally in the pro-
duction of downstream goods or services, is included in the mar-
ket for the base product. A higher price may bring an expansion
of production or shift away from internal use by the integrated
firm."' While the 1992 Merger Guidelines are somewhat ambig-
uous, the 1984 Merger Guidelines are categorically clear on the
point.213
The rule applied by the Commission is otherwise. In Man-
nesmann/Boge 4 the Commission excluded from the market for
shock absorber sales to motor vehicle manufacturers all shock
absorbers that they produced and used internally. The only ex-
planation offered was that these products did not represent an
alternative source of supply to other vehicle manufacturers. It
recognized that there was a "theoretical possibility" that the mo-
tor vehicle manufacturers might switch to their own production
in the event of a price increase by outside producers, but found
that such a switch would not occur because of the vehicle manu-
facturers' desire "to reduce production depth" and because al-
ternative sources were available. The Commission's "theoretical
possibility" is the reverse of the normal rationale for inclusion of
captive output in the market, namely that producers with captive
output would move to sales to outside producers in the event of
such an increase.
Mannesmann/Boge was followed in Accor/Wagon Lits215
where, in defining a market for group catering to hospitals and
educational and other institutions, the Commission excluded
212. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 2, at 535e.
213. The 1984Justice Department Merger Guidelines state that captive production
and consumption "are part of the overall market supply and demand." §2.23. The
current (1992) Merger Guidelines include such output of vertically integrated firms
when inclusion "accurately reflects their competitive significance in the relevant market
prior to the merger." §1.31.
214. Mannesmann/Boge, O.J. C 265/08 (1991).
215. Commission Decision No. 92/385/EEC, O.J. L 204/1 (1992) (Accor/Wagon
Lits).
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from the market catering carried out by the institutions them-
selves. This, the Commission explained, was "in line with the
Commission's consistent practice. ' 216 The Commission relied
upon Accor/Wagon Lits in Unilever France/OrtizMiko II2 7 to ex-
clude so-called artisinal ice cream from the market for impulse
ice cream. Impulse ice cream, consumed at or near the point of
sale, is a market that the Commission concluded was to be di-
vided into separate markets for wrapped ice cream, scooped ice
cream, and soft ice cream, a set of markets already defined in the
Commission's decision under Article 85 in Langanese-Iglo.218 Ar-
tisinal ice cream, manufactured by traveling dealers who pro-
duce their own ice cream and by very small manufacturers who
sell at the place of production and/or scattered local sites, was
excluded from the market even though it represented a very sub-
stantial share of ice cream sales in some Member States, in part
because some of the demand was captive.
B. The Definition of Geographic Markets Under the
Merger Regulation
Firms that sell the same products in mutually exclusive areas
do not compete in the same area and are not, therefore, in the
same geographic market. In merger cases, geographic market
definition is simply the process of identifying those firms that
produce the same product as the parties and provide reasonable
alternatives to consumers, thus limiting the ability of the merged
firms to raise prices to noncompetitive levels.
Under the Merger Guidelines geographic markets are de-
fined by starting with the geographic region in which the merg-
ing parties sell and asking whether a hypothetical monopolist
that was the only producer with locations in that area could prof-
itably impose a "small but significant and non-transitory" price
increase. 9 If firms with locations elsewhere are such a suffi-
ciently attractive alternative to buyers that an attempt to increase
price at the initial location would make sales unprofitable be-
cause of lost volume, these firms must be added to the market.
The market definition is expanded until a hypothetical monopo-
216. Id. at 15, 1 15.
217. Unilever France/OritzMiko II, O.J. C 55/05 (1994).
218. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (discussing Langanese-Iglo).
219. 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 18, § 1.21.
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list of the redefined area could impose such an increase. The
Merger Guidelines further provide that in judging likely buyer
response, the enforcement agencies will take into account evi-
dence that consumers have shifted, or have considered shifting,
purchases between areas in response to relative changes and that
sellers have based decisions on the likelihood of such switches.
The timing and costs of switching will also be considered. When
the hypothetical monopolist could successfully discriminate in
price among buyers in different locations and arbitrage is un-
likely, separate markets are indicated. The 1984 Merger Guide-
lines were more specific in identifying shipment patterns, trans-
portation costs, and costs of local distribution as relevant fac-
tors.22 ° In most cases these factors, along with a variety of
regulatory barriers, are the primary focus of the inquiry.
Unlike product market definition, the Merger Regulation
itself sets forth a general standard for the definition of geo-
graphic markets. Article 9, Section 7 of the Merger Regulation
states:
The geographical reference market shall consist of the area
in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the sup-
ply and demand of products or services, in which the condi-
tions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which
can be distinguished from neighboring areas because, in par-
ticular, conditions of competition are appreciably different in
these areas. The assessment should take account in particular
of the nature and characteristics of the products or services
concerned, of the existence of entry barriers or of consumer
preferences, of appreciable differences of the undertakings'
market shares between the area concerned and neighboring
areas or of substantial price differences.2 21
The first sentence of this provision is strikingly similar to the
general standard set forth by the Court of Justice in Suiker
Unie, 2 an Article 85 case.
This provision of the Merger Regulation appears in the arti-
cle pursuant to which the Commission is authorized to refer a
notified concentration to the competent authorities of Member
States when it is likely to impede competition through the crea-
220. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.32 (1984).
221. Commission Regulation No. 4064/89, supra note 127, art. 9(7), O.J. L257/14,
at 20 (1990).
222. Suiker Unie, [1975] E.C.R. at 1977, 371, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. at 451.
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tion or strengthening of a dominant position in a market within
a Member State. The appropriateness of referrals is not a ques-
tion discussed in this Article. The very fact that geographic mar-
ket definition plays a critical role in the process suggests that,
where referral is at issue, market definition may be under stress
as pressure is brought to bear on the Commission to refer a mat-
ter. The Commission's treatment of geographic market defini-
tions may generally be based on purely economic criteria, as ap-
pears to be the case, but where referral is at issue, undisclosed
non-economic factors may shape the way in which the market is
defined. This may have been the case, for example in McCor-
mick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann,22 3 where the Commission found a
separate national market for dried herbs and spices in Germany,
thereby permitting the Commission, which was unable to pro-
ceed itself because a critical deadline was missed, to refer the
matter.
Before turning to specific Commission decisions in detail,
several other general observations are in order. First, any assess-
ment of the Commission's approach to geographic markets must
recognize that the Community was born out of a desire to over-
come the fact that national boundary lines had long served as
major barriers to competition throughout Europe. Tariffs, quo-
tas, procurement policies, and variant technical and regulatory
requirements all served to segregate and protect national and
local markets. These barriers were reinforced in some cases by
language differences and local or national customs and prefer-
ences. For these and other reasons, even firms that operated in
a number of European countries often organized their distribu-
tion systems along national lines, using national sales subsidiar-
ies or other, less formal, means. As the Merger Regulation came
into effect, these national barriers were falling, and they con-
tinue to do so, but in some markets entrenched positions may
still hold. To a U.S. observer, the Commission still seems overly
willing to define markets as national through reliance on such
factors as national concentration data, price differences deter-
mined along national lines, and disparate national market
shares. Logically, these do necessarily reflect national border
barriers. When the Commission, for example, uses a sharp dis-
223. McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann, OJ. C 256/03 (1993). See Lowe,
supra note 127, at 145.
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parity in national market shares as a factor in reaching the con-
clusion that markets are national, as it frequently does, it as-
sumes that national, as opposed, for example, to regional, mar-
ket shares are something meaningful. But why should such
shares be determined on a national basis in the first place? The
Commission has defined markets as narrowly as the area within a
twenty minute drive to a supermarket2 24 and as broadly as the
world.225 It has in a limited number of cases defined markets in
terms of regions within Europe that overlap national bounda-
ries. 26 In most cases, however, the critical issue is whether the
market in question is national or Community-wide, or, in some
later, cases EEA-wide. Some of the key factors the Commission
examines, and the way in which the data upon which it relies is
organized, seems to lead it to perceive the issue in this way.
Given the Community's background, the continuing concern
with breaking down national barriers, and the fact that even with
these barriers falling markets that benefitted from national pro-
tection are slow to change, it is neither surprising nor unwise
that the Commission so often sees the issue in national-EC
terms.
Second, because the Merger Regulation coincides with, and
indeed may be seen as part of, the intensification of the Commu-
nity's efforts to harmonize a variety of legal, technical and other
regulatory standards throughout the Community, geographic
market definition has been particularly impacted by the transi-
tion issues discussed earlier. The Commission as a result has
been required to focus on not only the existence of barriers of
this sort, but also on the imminence of their demise and their
lingering effects.
Third, it is important again not to give too much weight to
notifications where a variety of possible geographic markets are
discussed, but for the purposes of decision the narrowest mar-
kets are assumed. There are clues in these decisions, but often
not much more.
224. Promodes/BRMC, OJ. C 232/14 (1992).
225. The geographic markets in most defense industries have been defined as
world-wide. See Aerospatiale/MBB, O.J. C 59/13 (1991); Thomson/Shorts, OJ. C 136/
4 (1993); Thomson-CSF, O.J. C 264/9 (1995). See also Aerospatiale-Alenia/De Havil-
land, O.J. L 334/42 (1991); Metallgesellschaft/Safic Alcan, O.j. C 300/12 (1991).
226. There are relatively few cases of this sort. See Eridiana/ISI, O.J. C 204/09
(1991); VIAG/Continental Can, O.J. C 156/10 (1991).
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Turning to the decisions themselves, it is clear that where
the issue is close no single factor is decisive. There are, of
course, cases where a single factor may be decisive, particularly
when there are significant trade or regulatory barriers, or trans-
port costs are extremely high and, as a result, markets must be
viewed as national or local.2 2 7 On the same basis, high tariffs
and/or transport costs on goods coming into the Common Mar-
ket indicate that the market does not extend beyond the Euro-
pean Community.22 There are also cases in markets that have
been the subject of previous decisions where the outcome
turned on what the Commission already had decided. Pharma-
ceutical and insurance markets are national. Markets for major
items of military equipment are world-wide. These decisions
may be reexamined as the presence of regulatory barriers fall.
Similarly, the Commission may be prepared to reevaluate mar-
kets defined in older decisions under Articles 85 and 86.229 For
lawyers handling cases confronted with precedent of this type,
the central issue will be whether market conditions have
changed since the earlier decision.
Most cases, however, involve an evaluation of a multiplicity
of factors, some of which may point in opposite directions.
While transport costs, shipment and purchasing patterns, and
price correlations, or the lack thereof, seem to be the most sig-
nificant of these factors, others have played an important role.
Different market shares among major producers in different
Member States are taken as evidence that the market is no
greater than national, even though it also indicates that these
firms are making sales in each. High concentration levels in a
given Member States are thought to be evidence of the same.
Here, as with the analysis of differing market shares, the data
used as a starting point is almost invariably national. Signifi-
cantly, different price levels between geographic areas have been
a major element in determining that each of these areas is a sep-
arate geographic market. Weight has been put on consumer
227. See supra notes 143-53 and accompanying text (discussing Commission's defi-
nitions of markets).
228. See, e.g., Commission Notice, OJ. C 259/06 (1994) [hereinafter Rhone-
Poulenc/Caffaro]; Du Pont/ICI, O.J. L 7/13 (1992).
229. See Eridiana/ISI, O.J. C 204/09 (1991) (reexamining geographic market defi-
nition for sugar employed in Suiker Unie). See also Commission Notice, O.J. C 165/39
(1992) [hereinafter Solvay-Laporte/Interox].
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buying preferences, and, therefore, the presence or absence of
Euro-brands advertised and promoted throughout the Commu-
nity, as opposed to brands that are promoted in a single Member
State. In addition, particularized needs, such as buyers' need for
proximity to production plants to insure just-in-time delivery has
been a factor in determining the geographic market. Organiza-
tion of distribution systems on a national basis has been another
factor in cases holding that a market is national, as opposed to
Community-wide. Language differences also play a role in a lim-
ited number of cases. The cases discussed below illustrate how
each of these factors has been applied.
In Magnetti-Marelli/CEAc,23 ° the second case in which the
Commission initiated full proceedings, the Commission set the
stage for utilization of several factors analyzed in subsequent
cases in an increasingly refined way. The Commission con-
cluded that the market for replacement starter batteries was na-
tional, for France and Italy, rather than Community-wide, be-
cause market shares of the producers varied significantly be-
tween Member States, and prices in Germany and Spain were
higher than elsewhere in the Community. These are two of the
key factors described in the Merger Regulation itself. These dif-
ferences, the Commission believed, could be attributed to a vari-
ety of causes. The Commission mentioned causes such as differ-
ent product ranges being sold in different Member States, vary-
ing stock of existing vehicles, differences in brand preferences,
significant differences in distribution channels. The Commis-
sion also noted that the concentration of supply in these markets
constituted a significant entry barrier which made it difficult for
other firms to increase market shares or enter. The Commission
did not use high concentration to suggest that interdependent
pricing had raised prices to above competitive levels. Its sugges-
tion that high concentration is an entry barrier is elaborated
upon in Nestle/Perrier and Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz,2"' dis-
cussed below. Missing from the decision is any detailed analysis
of interpenetration data reflecting the level of imports and ex-
230. Magnetti-Marelli/CEAc, O.J. L 222/38 (1991). The Commission elaborated
upon and followed the analysis of geographic market for starter batteries at issue in
Magnetti-Marelli in subsequent decisions. See e.g., Varta/Bosch, O.J. L 320/26, at 31,
38 (1991) (discussing arguments for finding that geographic market was Europe).
231. Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz, O.J. L 354/32 (1994), [1995] 1 C.E.C.
2466.
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ports to and from France and Italy from other Member States.
As the Commission has gained experience in merger cases, such
data has become a key element in its analysis.
A significant disparity in market shares on a national basis
has continued to be a significant element in the Commission's
analysis, as set forth in the Merger Regulation, just as relative
uniformity of national market shares has taken to be indicative
of an Community-wide market. In Mannesmann/Boge232 the re-
placement shock absorber market was defined in Community-
wide terms, with emphasis being placed on the fact that all major
manufacturers were present in all Member States, market shares
were very even, and there was evidence of strong and mutual
penetration of Member State markets, with imports representing
fifty percent or more of total sales. The OEM was more com-
plex. Market shares were less uniform, with national producers
having the highest shares in several Member States, a fact
deemed unimportant because physical proximity of vehicle man-
ufacturers to supplies was not "a decisive geographic barrier."
This appears to be an explanation as to why significant variations
in market share are important. In this case, the critical element
seemed to be that European vehicle manufacturers asserted that
they purchased on a Community-wide basis. In Mannesmann/
VDO, 233 another case involving the sale of auto parts to manufac-
turers, the Commission followed its earlier decision, but ob-
served that where different market shares are extreme the as-
sumption that markets for auto parts are Community-wide might
not hold, at least in the absence of evidence of significant intra-
Community trading. While market share disparity continues to
be an element in analysis, particularly where national companies
have very high shares in their home state,23 4 it appears to be only
a starting point and of consequence only when the variations in
shares are quite large. The Commission, in recent cases where
there were such disparities, has not rested on that fact alone but
has gone on to examine the underlying reasons for them. In
Knorr-Bremse/Allied Signal,135 although no decision was ultimately
reached, the Commission noted that, while the national market
232. Mannesmann/Boge, 0.J. C 265/08 (1991).
233. Commission Notice, O.J. C 297/12 (1991) (Mannesmann/VDO).
234. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 57/07 (1995) [hereinafter Svenska Cellulosa/
PWA].
235. Commission Notice, O.J. C 298/04 (1993) [hereinafter Knorr-Bremse].
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shares for replacement brake system components varied consid-
erably, the disparity was not a good indication of national mar-
kets because it was attributable to different vehicle mixes and the
consumers' preference for a replacement part of the make em-
ployed by the original vehicle manufacturer.
The current approach is shown in Mercedes-Benz/Kass-
bohrer.236 While the Commission's analysis of the geographic
market for city buses begins with the observation that market
shares of major manufacturers varied significantly between
Member States, with national companies having the highest
share in their home countries, the decision that Germany was a
separate market actually rests on the fact that there was a rela-
tively low level of imports into the German market and public
authorities in Germany routinely purchased German products.
High concentration in national markets has also been a fac-
tor in defining markets in national terms in a handful of cases in
addition to the battery decisions. While a large number of fac-
tors led to the conclusion in Nestle/Perrie237 that France, as op-
posed to a larger regional area including Belgium and parts of
Germany, was the relevant market for bottled source water, the
Commission bolstered its decision with a finding that a very high
degree of concentration in France was a barrier to entry because
it increased the likelihood of reaction against newcomers, a view
it expressed again in Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz.238 In these
two cases, the reference to high concentration in a national mar-
ket seems incidental to the outcomes, which were based on a
number of other, more important, elements. To an American
antitrust lawyer, the fact that high concentration is perceived as
a barrier to entry seems curious. 239 High concentration is nor-
mally associated with the likelihood of interdependent, supra-
competitive pricing. Such pricing is not a barrier but an invita-
tion to enter.240
236. Mercedes-Benz/Kassbohrer, O.J. L 211/1 (1995). See Commission Notice,
OJ. C 24/06 (1995) [hereinafter Elsag Bailey/Hartmann & Braun Age].
237. Nestle/Perrier, OJ. L 356/1 (1992).
238. Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz, OJ. L 354/32 (1994), [1995] 1 C.E.C.
2466.
239. But see FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (expressing view
that fear of retaliation by firms in increasingly concentrated market might serve as bar-
rier to entry and deterrent to aggressive competition by small firms in market already).
240. High concentration might of cours be reflective of scale economies, the
presence of which would make entry by outside firms with higher costs less likely. If on
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Of the three critical elements in Magnetti-Marelli/CEAc, in-
cluding disparate market shares, high national concentration,
and significant variations in national prices, the last has been the
most commonly employed in finding markets national. In defin-
ing the market for dried herbs and spices as Germany, for exam-
ple, the Commission in McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann2 41
concluded that, while price differences were eroding, differ-
ences remained and price negotiations were generally carried
out at the national level. Again defining the market as Germany,
this time for potash, the Commission in Kali + SalZ2 4 2 pointed to
significantly higher prices in Germany than in the rest of the
Community, even though German producers had substantial ex-
cess capacity. Interestingly, the Commission also defined the
market for the rest of the Community as Community-wide, rest-
ing in part on the generally comparable prices throughout the
rest of the area. Substantial price differences also played a role
in Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz, although emphasis was also
placed on the relationship of price movements between Member
States.
Significant differences in prices between geographic areas
do not necessarily indicate that each of these areas is a separate
market. Different price levels may suggest cost advantages result-
ing from greater efficiencies, lower wages or other locally varying
costs, differences in transport costs, and so on. Sellers in the low
cost areas may be insulated from the competition of those in
high cost areas, suggesting that the low price area is a separate
market. But buyers in the high price areas clearly could be ex-
pected to switch to sellers in the low cost areas in case of a price
increase if the price advantage of doing so is more than its ad-
ded costs, such as higher transport costs, assuming that no other
barriers are present. 243 The high price area should not be char-
examination in a given area supra-competitive prices are being charged, that fact alone
may indicate market power. That would be true without regard to concentration levels
elsewhere.
241. McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann, OJ. C 256/03 (1993).
242. Commission Decision No. 94/449/EC, Oj. L 186/38 (1994) [hereinafter
Kali + Salz].
243. This very point seems to have been recognized by the Court of First Instance
in Hilti, an Article 86 case, and by the Commission in Cement, a case under Article 85.
See supra notes 121-26 (discussing geogral hic market definition in terms of price differ-
ences).
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acterized as a market on the basis of price differences alone.2 44
Real price levels in different areas may be very difficult to deter-
mine, moreover, in the face of varying patterns of rebates, dis-
counts, and other conditions of purchase. Such data, therefore,
is often unreliable. For this reason, the Commission in Mercedes-
Benz/Kassbohrer245 found it inappropriate to rely on price com-
parisons. Instead, it focused on interpenetration of sales among
Member States.
While price and market share disparities continue to play a
role in the Commission's analysis, significantly greater emphasis
has been put on the relationship between prices, that is, price
correlations, shipment patterns, transport costs, and particular-
ized consumer needs and preferences. Positive price correla-
tions, evidence that prices have moved similarly in different ar-
eas, suggest that there is a single geographic market. Where
prices differ and price movements are uncorrelated, however,
separate markets are likely to be found. Similarly, significant im-
ports from one area into another and significant exports from
the second area to the first suggest that there is a single market.
A lack of exports from and imports in a given area is more am-
biguous, at least in the absence of evidence of low price correla-
tions."' The Commission has relied on price correlation data,
often in combination with shipment data, both in finding mar-
kets to be Community-wide, and, in some cases, world-wide, and
in finding markets to be national. In Mannesmann/Boge,2 47 for
example, the Commission found that there was a strong and re-
ciprocal penetration of sales of shock absorbers for the replace-
ment market throughout the Common Market, with imports
representing as much as fifty percent of total sales.2 4 8 Con-
versely, in McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann, Germany was held
to be the relevant geographic market for dried herbs and spices,
in part because imports into Germany were at very low levels. 49
244. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 112-13.
245. Mercedes-Benz/Kassbohrer, O.J. L 211/1 (1995).
246. The lack of exports and imports may simply reflect the fact that both markets
are competitive. The analysis of likely responses to a significant price increase in one
area should focus on transport costs.
247. Mannesmann/Boge, O.J. C 265/08 (1991).
248. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 58/05 (1992) (using similar analyses) [herein-
after Torras/Serio]; see also Commission Notice, O.J. C 82/04 (1995) (making heavy use
of customer interviews) [hereinafter Dalgety PLC/The Quaker Oats Company].
249. McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann, O.J. C 256/03 (1993).
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The most detailed examination of these factors has been
in Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva (DMV),250 where the issue was
whether the market for stainless steel tubes was Community-
wide, world-wide, or a geographic area broader than Europe but
narrower than world-wide. The Commission found that the
United States, Japan, and Western Europe were separate mar-
kets. The Commission has dealt with a number of cases where
the argument has been made that the market is world-wide, or at
least larger than Western Europe. It has found markets world-
wide when dealing with sales of aircraft, satellite equipment, and
other similar material where the sales are not to government
agencies for defense or other governmental purposes.251 Tech-
nology licensing cases have to date defined the geographic mar-
ket as world-wide.25 2 More often in these cases, because of high
transport costs and/or significant tariffs on goods coming into
the European Community, the market is ultimately defined as
the Community, including, in later cases, the EEA countries. In
Mannesmann,253 the Commission referred to both tariffs and
transport costs, but based its conclusion primarily on a very care-
ful analysis of price correlations and shipment data. Price corre-
lations between the United States and Europe were strong, but
in the absence of other supporting evidence, such as mutual
penetration of geographic areas, a high degree of price correla-
tion was not itself sufficient to establish a market broader than
Western Europe. The Commission seems to have concluded
that an absence of price correlation is a stronger indication of
separate markets than the reverse. While exports from Western
Europe exceeded ten percent of total production, import pene-
tration into Western Europe was significantly less. The Commis-
sion specifically considered the so-called Elzinga-Hogarty test,25 4
which concludes that either an import or export level in excess
250. Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva (DMV), O.J. L 102/15, at 21, 37 (1994),
[1994] 1 C.E.C. 2136.
251. See generally Thomson-CSF, O.J. C 264/9 (1995); Thomson/Shorts, O.J. C
136/4 (1993); Aerospatiale/MBB, O.J. C 59/13 (1991).
252. See Shell/Montecantini, O.J. L 332/48 (1994); Union Carbide/Enichem, O..
C 123/05 (1995).
253. Mannesmann Vallourec/Ilva (DMV) O.J. L 102/15, at 20, 29 (1994),
[1994], 1 C.E.C. 2136.
254. K. Elzinga & T. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in An-
timerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973); K Elzinga & T. Hogarty, The Problem of
Geographic Market Delineation Revisited: The Case of Coal, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1978).
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of ten percent is indicative of a wider market, faulting the test on
the ground that mutual penetration was necessary to permit ar-
bitrage based on price differences in between areas. The latter
argument seems at least debatable. The issue, after all, is what
the response to a significant future price increase is likely to be.
Static existing shipment data is not necessarily indicative of an
absence of future response in one direction or the other.255
Not surprisingly, transport costs have played a significant
role in the Commission's decisions. Where transport costs are
sufficiently high that it would be unprofitable for firms outside a
given area to sell into that area even in the face of a significant
price increase, that area is most likely a separate market, as the
Commission has recognized. 56 In Pilkington-Techint/SIV257 for
example, the Commission found that transport costs of glass
were sufficiently high that each of some thirty-six flat glass plants
in the European Community served an area approximating a cir-
cle with a radius of some five hundred kilometers. Because the
circles substantially overlapped, however, it was appropriate to
define the market as at least Community-wide. The Commission
has used the same overlapping concentric circle analysis in de-
fining food retailing markets. While from the consumers' point
of view the market is narrowly local, these being markets deter-
mined by consumers' willingness to travel, markets were defined
more broadly because of the overlaps of these areas.258
Variations in distribution systems in different Member
States have also been thought indicative of national markets.
Why this is so is not altogether clear. In several decisions, the
Commission has simply indicated without explanation that, even
when major firms are present and selling in a number of Mem-
ber States, the organization of marketing and distribution on a
national level was a factor in finding a given product market na-
tional. 2 5 9 This may reflect nothing more than a judgment that
companies that organize their distribution along national
255. See Cement, O.J. L 343/1 (1994) (noting meaning of shipment data).
256. See Kali + Salz, O.J. L 186/38 (1994) (explaining use of transport costs); see
also Nestle/Perrier, OJ. L 356/1 (1992) (discussing importance of transport costs).
257. Pilkington-Techint/SIV, 0.J. L 158/24, at 24, 1 4 (1994). See supra note 124
(contrasting Article 86 decision in Italian Flat Glass).
258. Promodes/BRMC, OJ. C 232/14 (1992).
259. See, e.g., Commission Notice, 0J. C 226/04 (1993) (Nesle/Italgel); Commis-
sion Notice, 0J. C 273/06 (1993) [hereinafter American Cyanamid/Shell]; Knorr-
Bremse, 0J. C 298/05 (1993); Mannesmann/Valourec/Ilva (DMV), OJ. L 102/15
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boundary lines, for example, making sales in Germany through a
German sales subsidiary, must do so because of variations in lo-
cal customs, buying preferences, which may also be reflected in
the use of national rather than Euro-brands, legal or technical
barriers, or language difficulties. These factors can be addressed
directly, however, without using differences in the structure of
distribution as a surrogate. The Commission has long been con-
cerned, of course, with breaking down distribution restraints,
particularly prohibitions on parallel imports by distributors, but
assuming that no such prohibitions exist, there is no reason to
believe that parallel imports will not occur in response to price
increases in a given area. In those cases where an explanation
has been given, the focus has been either on the added costs of
having to adjust marketing strategies in different areas because
of the prevalence of one type of distribution in one area and
another elsewhere, thus making it difficult to employ a common
strategy throughout the Common Market,2 60 or because diffi-
culty of access to distribution in a given Member State operates
as a barrier to entry.261 An inability to obtain access to local dis-
tributors may be such a barrier, but this would presumably be of
greatest concern when the focus is on the ability of firms not
currently making sales in the area to do so, not when those firms
already have a significant presence.
Of importance in some cases is the nature of brands under
which goods are sold, advertised, and promoted. The Commis-
sion, in merger cases, has not suggested that product markets
should be defined in terms of brands. It has, however, used the
distinction between national brands and Euro-brands in differ-
entiating national and Community-wide markets. In Procter &
Gamble/VP Schickedanz, 62 one of the key elements in a determi-
nation that the market for sanitary napkins was national, for Ger-
many and Spain, was the fact that no major supplier sold under
the same brand names throughout Europe, even though several
sold in most Member States. While several heavily promoted
brands were sold in a number of countries, a large proportion of
(1994), [1994] 1 C.E.C. 2136. But see supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Michelin and Tetra Pak I).
260. Magnetti-Marelli/CEAc, 0.J. L 222/38 (1991).
261. McCormick/CPC/Rabobank/Ostmann, 0.J. C 256/03 (1993).
262. Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz, 0.J. L 354/32 (1994), [1995] 1 C.E.C.
2466.
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sales was under "important, essentially national brands." To be
sure, the Commission's decision was based on several other fac-
tors. Price levels and market shares differed significantly from
country to country, purchasing was generally done on a national
basis, concentration in each country was high, and there was a
high degree of brand loyalty. The emphasis on national brands,
both as an indication of consumer preference and as a barrier to
entry, is striking. Just as the prevalence of national brands has
been taken to suggest that markets are national, brands common
throughout Europe have been indicative of a Community-wide
market.2 63
Finally, the Commission has looked to particular customers'
needs, which suggests that markets must be limited to firms ca-
pable of meeting these needs. With respect to both newspaper
and television markets, for example, markets have been defined
in national terms in large part because of language and cultural
differences that play a key role in news, editorial, and program
content.264 For products like complex machinery, the need for
technical assistance or rapid servicing has been recognized as a
basis for confining markets geographically to firms that can pro-
vide such services rapidly and dependably.2 65 Where customers
are manufacturers whose production is dependent on just-in-
time delivery, the need for physical proximity to the suppliers'
plants has been stressed in rejecting arguments that markets
were Community-wide. 2 1 A particularly interesting example is
Metallgesallschaft/SaficAlcan,267 where the market for natural rub-
ber was defined as world-wide. For latex, however, the market
was characterized as Community-wide because customers' need
for rapid delivery required the presence of supply tanks within
the Common Market.
263. See Dalgety PLC/The Quaker Oats Company, OJ. C 82/04 (1995). See also
Svenska Cellulosa/PWA, O.J. C 57/07 (1995).
264. See Newspaper Publishing, OJ. C 85/6 (1994) (discussing definition for news-
paper markets); MSG/Media Service, OJ. L 364/1 (1994), [1995] 1 C.E.C. 2509 (ex-
plaining television markets). See also Commission Notice, OJ. C 93/08 (1991) (noting
markets for mail order catalogues) [hereinafter Otto/Grattan].
265. See Mannesmann/Hoesch, OJ. L 114/34 (1993) (discussing criteria for defin-
ing markets); Vesuvius/Wulfrath, OJ. C 259/03 (1994).
266. See VIAG/Continental Case, OJ. C 156/10 (1991). See also Crown Cork &
Seal/Carnaud Metalbox, OJ. L 75/38 (1995). Cf Mannesmann/Boge, OJ. C 265/08
(1991) (noting that in particular case physical proximity not critical tojust-in-time deliv-
ery and therefore not "decisive" barrier).
267. Metallgesallschaft/SaficAlcan, OJ. C 300/12 (1991).
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While the discussion above identifies and, in some cases,
questions a number of the elements commonly employed in the
Commission's analysis, seldom is any one determinative. No
case better exemplifies this than Procter & Gamble/Schickedanz,
where both product and geographic markets were hotly con-
tested. The Commission examined differences in market shares
and price levels, price movements, concentration levels, plant sit-
ings for the purpose of shortening delivery distances, distribu-
tion systems, the presence or absence of Euro-brands, consumer
product preferences, and entry barriers.
In a large number of cases, transitional questions arising
from the lingering presence of a variety of technical standards,
regulatory approval requirements, and procurement policies
have come into play, as discussed in more detail above. These
transitional concerns have been worked into the Commission's
analysis in conjunction with the factors already discussed, 26 8 and
have added to the Commission's consideration of geographic
market definition an added degree of complexity that does not
confront U.S. courts and enforcement authorities.
Overall, much of the Commission's analysis will seem famil-
iar to U.S. antitrust lawyers. The Commission does not generally
pose the question asked by the Merger Guidelines, namely, what
is the likely response by buyers and sellers in response to a signif-
icant price increase. Will buyers look to purchasers outside a
given area, and will outside firms be able to respond profitably
through sale into the area? This question has been directly
posed to both buyers and sellers in a few cases, and some weight
may be given to their answers. 69 Whether the question is posed
in this fashion or not, the Commission's analysis is generally con-
sistent with the U.S. approach, where factors such as price dis-
crimination, price correlations, shipment data, transport costs,
strong consumer preferences and particularized needs, and, in
some cases, legal and regulatory barriers have been at the heart
of the analysis. While it is true that the use of differences in
market shares and absolute price levels, as set forth in the
Merger Regulation itself, concentration levels and distribution
268. See Commission Notice, O.J. C 187/07 (1990) (blending analysis of transi-
tional concerns with variety of other factors) [hereinafter Electrolux/AEG].
269. See, e.g., Commission Notice, O.J. C 204/06 (1993) [hereinafter Costa
Crociere/Chargeurs/Accor].
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systems among different geographic areas as elements seem
questionable and are not a common part of the analysis in the
United States, these factors have generally played a subordinate
role in recent cases or have caused inquiry into a variety of other
factors that seem more directly relevant.
CONCLUSION
Market definition is a very fact-specific process. Because the
emphasis on particular elements of the analysis will vary from
case to case, decisions are difficult to compare and general
themes are not easily identified. The characterization of out-
comes as broad or narrow is not particularly useful, having little
to do with whether they are right or wrong. Reliance on a partic-
ular factor in one case, but not in another, does not mean that
either is incorrect, because it is usually a combination of factors
that is critical. Despite these difficulties, however, some general
themes can be identified.
It has been said from time to time that the Commission and
Court of Justice have tailored market definitions to reach partic-
ular outcomes that reflect substantive policies other than those
based on conventional antitrust concerns over market power.
There is some truth in this observation, at least with respect to
Article 86 cases dealing with essential facilities, refusals to deal,
and some other vertical restraints. Markets in these decisions do
seem to have been drawn more narrowly than a purely economic
concern about adverse price and output effects would warrant,
but this is a very limited number of relatively discrete cases. It
cannot be said of most Articles 85 and 86 cases, where market
definition has been at issue, and it is certainly not true of deci-
sions under the Merger Regulation.
Can it be said that the market definition process in the Eu-
ropean Community has become more sophisticated? Decisions
under the Merger Regulation, particularly those following the
initiation of proceedings, do show a maturation of the process as
greater weight has been given to such things as cross-elasticity
studies, price correlations, and market interpenetration data. In
their totality the merger decisions seem to present a more cohe-
sive, coherent whole. There are a variety of reasons for this.
The Court of First Instance and Court of Justice have played lit-
tle role to date in merger cases. Market definition in such cases
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has been left to the Commission, and particularly to the Merger
Task Force, a relatively small group in which consistency and co-
hesiveness are more readily obtained. Merger cases have not
generally involved vertical issues or refusals to deal, and thus
have not had to confront the somewhat peculiar market defini-
tions that appear in Article 86 cases dealing with those issues.
Merger decisions also tend to contain fuller expositions of the
Commission's thinking than appear in a number of other cases.
The use by the Commission in merger cases of a standard format
and methodology, including the use of competitor and customer
surveys, also leads in the direction of consistency in analysis.
It does not follow, however, that outcomes vary significantly
from those under Article 86, even in older cases. The holding in
the Court of Justice in Continental Can, for example, rests on a
relatively sophisticated analysis. There are, of course, older deci-
sions like Michelin that can and should be criticized. A good deal
of criticism has been directed at cases like Hugin/Liptons, but
much of that criticism assumes that the policies at issue are con-
ventional U.S. antitrust policies. A strong argument can be
made for the proposition that cases of this sort reflect different
concerns, such as fairness or abuse of dependent relationships.
If this is truly the case, criticism of market definitions in those
cases on purely economic grounds may be misplaced. Whatever
one'sjudgment about older Article 86 cases, however, it is surely
true that the analysis in Articles 85 and 86 cases has also ma-
tured, as evidenced by decisions like Tetra Pak II and Cement.
Whether this is the result of interplay between merger decisions
and others cannot be determined, but this may well be the case.
The relationship between Article 86 and merger cases that is
visible runs in the other direction. Article 86 cases have been
expressly relied upon and followed in a number of merger deci-
sions. The most obvious examples are the Commission's contin-
ued recognition in auto supply cases of the distinction between
OEM and replacement markets drawn in Michelin and the reli-
ance in transport cases on Ahmed Saeed. The treatment of geo-
graphic markets in Hilti also appears to have had an influence in
merger decisions. Other examples might be given. That such a
relationship exists is hardly surprising. The Merger Task Force
did not spring out of nowhere. Article 86 precedents already
existed. Nor does the Task Force work in a vacuum. Interplay
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between merger decisions must be expected to run in both di-
rections.
Do EC decisions on market definition, particularly under
the Merger Regulation, depart significantly from the approach
taken in the Merger Guidelines? In one significant respect, the
treatment of supply substitutability, they do. While there are
signs of changes, the Commission and European courts gener-
ally have not used supply substitutability in market definition,
but have considered it in the broader assessment of competitive
effects. But so long as it is considered, does it really matter
where? Other specific differences, such as the treatment of cap-
tive output, can be identified. Certainly the Commission has not
purported to be as precise in its approach as the Merger Guide-
lines, with their five percent price increase standard and detailed
analysis of sunk costs, time frames, and so on. This is not a criti-
cism. Some believe, after all, that the apparent precision of the
Merger Guidelines is illusory. While the EC analysis tends to use
short time frames in its market definition, for which it has been
criticized, the time periods set forth in the Merger Guidelines
are not significantly different. In short, the EC approach and
the approach of the Merger Guidelines are far more similar than
divergent.
Finally, a study of market definition in the European Com-
munity done ten years from now will undoubtedly not look the
same as this one. The influence of the Court of First Instance,
already apparent, will increase. More important, markets them-
selves will change. As the European market becomes more
"common," there will be less concern about transitional
problems. Geographic markets will continue to expand to more
regularly include other countries in Europe that accede to the
European Union or in other ways become affiliated with it.
Once this occurs, the focus may shift to consideration of re-
gional markets which overlap national boundaries. As other bar-
riers fall, the concept of world markets will become more com-
monplace. Markets evolve. So too will market definitions.
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